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Abstract
The present dissertation aims to extend classical tax competition to a more general
framework in which jurisdictions compete in both taxes and non-tax instruments. In
this context, issues related to dynamic competition and tax coordination are investi-
gated.
Dynamic aspects of multi-dimensional competition. Under dynamic competition, firms
choose their location dynamically in each period to maximize their respective profits.
We develop a dynamic relocation rule of firms based on the home attachment prin-
ciple. Applying this rule, dynamic competition in taxes and public services among
unequally sized jurisdictions is investigated. We account for the widely recognized
characteristic that small states are more flexible in their decison-making than larger
economies. However, small countries may suffer from limited institutional capacity in
the provision of public services. Consequently, small and large countries behave asym-
metrically when they compete for internationally mobile capital. This heterogeneity is
analyzed within a differential game framework. We demonstrate that in case of high
capital mobility small economies may collapse economically if public services are inef-
ficiently provided. When capital mobility is very low, a small state’s economy always
expands despite its limited institutional capacity.
Tax coordination aspects. When jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure, the
desirability of tax coordination is analyzed. The timing of the game is considered in
two different ways, simultaneous and sequential games. Two tax coordination devices
(a common tax rate and a minimum tax rate) are considered. We demonstrate that tax
coordination does not necessarily generate the welfare effects often observed in pure
tax competition literature. The reason is that the decision to coordinate on tax rate in-
duces a carry-over effect on infrastructure expenditures. Moreover, we highlight that
tax coordination is more likely to be detrimental when countries can compete simulta-
neously in taxes and infrastructure, rather than sequentially.
Then, we investigate whether partial tax coordination benefits the tax union (the in-
siders) and/or the outsiders since tax coordination can be decided among a subset of
countries that forms a tax union. The member states of the union coordinate tax poli-
cies but still compete in infrastructure provision. In addition, the union as a whole
competes in taxes and infrastructure with the rest of the world. We demonstrate that
partial tax coordination can harm both union members and non-union members. This
contrasts with the classical view that partial tax coordination is Pareto improving.
Size effect on social welfare. Finally, we analyze how social welfare is impacted by in-
creasing the size asymmetry of countries when they compete in taxes and infrastruc-
ture. It appears that increasing size asymmetry does not necessarily exacerbate the
inefficiency of tax competition. More precisely, if the degree of international openness
is low (high), social welfare decreases (increases) with size asymmetry.
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Chapter 1
Interjurisdictional Competition and
Coordination
1.1 Introduction
Tax competition is defined as noncooperative tax setting by independent governments,
under which each government’s policy choices influence the allocation of a mobile tax
base among jurisdictions (Wilson and Wildasin, 2004). In general, independent gov-
ernments are assumed to engage in tax competition to maximize the welfare of their
residents.
The present dissertation aims to extend pure tax competition to a more general frame-
work in which jurisdictions compete in both taxes and non-tax instruments (for exam-
ple, infrastructure provision). In this context, issues related to dynamic competition
and tax coordination are investigated.
In the following sections, pure tax competition (and coordination) andmulti-dimensional
competition (and coordination) are briefly reviewed.
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1.1.1 Pure tax competition and coordination
Traditional contributions to the theory of pure tax competition suggest that competi-
tion for capital leads to inefficiently low tax rates and the under-provision of public
goods. The reason is that competing jurisdictions do not account for the fact that the
modifying their respective tax rates impacts the welfare of rival jurisdictions. This fis-
cal externality leads to inefficiencies, which are analyzed by Oates (1972) and formally
modeled by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). Growing economic
integration has increased international factor mobility, which puts downward pressure
on national tax policies and possibly leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ in taxes.
Numerous extensions have beenmade to the early contributions by Zodrow andMieszkowski
(1986) andWilson (1986) (see comprehensive surveys,Wilson, 1999; Wilson andWildasin,
2004; Boadway and Tremblay, 2011). Wilson (1995) studies tax competition with mo-
bile production factors, whereas other papers (seeWildasin andWilson, 1996; Burbidge
and Myers, 1994; Wellisch, 1994) consider cases of imperfect mobility of factors. Sev-
eral authors (Wilson, 1995; Hoyt, 1991; Krelove, 1993; Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991;
Jensen and Toma, 1991) analyze tax competition among jurisdictions assuming that
local governments compete with more than two tax instruments.
Asymmetric competition among jurisdictions has also attracted attention in tax com-
petition literature (see for example, Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991; Kanbur and Keen,
1993). Bucovetsky (1991) addresses tax competition when competing countries differ
in size1. Kanbur and Keen (1993) consider asymmetric2 tax competition and the wel-
fare implications of tax coordination. They show that larger country faces a lower tax
elasticity of capital than do smaller rivals, and hence lower marginal cost of public
funds. Therefore, they choose higher tax rates than the smaller countries. Moreover,
some authors (Kanbur and Keen, 1993 ) demonstrate that size differences between
competing jurisdictions exacerbate the inefficiencies of noncooperative tax behavior.
Consequently, reducing the disparities in size should be strictly Pareto-improving.
1Wilson (1991) assumes that the endowment of capital is asymmetric among competing regions.
2They assume that competing countries are unequally populated.
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Models of tax competition usually assume a single-period framework and few papers
investigate fiscal competition in a dynamic setting. Coates (1993) considers the issue
of property tax competition. His model captures the intertemporal trade-offs between
the current and future consumption of both private and public goods. He partially
analyzes the open-loop equilibrium of a dynamic game. Cardarelli (2002) focuses on
trigger-type strategies in a model of repeated tax competition.
Fiscal competition in both space (i.e., the movement of resources among jurisdictions)
and time (i.e., the movement process occurs gradually) is studied by Wildasin (2003)
in an explicitly dynamic framework. The model assumes that the degree of factor
mobility between jurisdictions is imperfect because it is costly and time-consuming
to adjust factor stocks. The paper shows that taxation of mobile factors in the short
run redistributes income in favor of the owners of immobile resources, even though
this is harmful in the long run. This is because there are short-run rents that can be
captured from the non-resident owners of these factors. Wildasin (2011) investigates
the comparative dynamics of adjustment to changes in local fiscal policy with two
imperfectly mobile productive resources. He suggests that the evaluation of the fiscal
treatment of one resource must account for the simultaneous adjustment of both.
Tax coordination has been proposed to correct the inefficiencies resulting from tax com-
petition. Two most commonly advanced coordination devices3 are tax harmonization
and the imposition of a minimum tax rate. For example, Kanbur and Keen (1993) study
commodity tax coordination between two unequally sized countries. They show that
tax harmonization and setting a minimum tax rate can be Pareto improving. When tax
coordination is implemented among a subset of all the considered countries, Konrad
and Schjelderup (1999) show that in the standard tax competition framework, partial
tax harmonization is Pareto improving if the tax rates are strategic complements.
However, an inconsistency between theoretical and empirical results can arise. For ex-
ample, empirical evidence of tax competition does not support the ‘race to the bottom’
3The existing literature also suggests other ways of coordination. Wildasin (1989) suggests that cen-
tral governments can provide regions with a ‘corrective subsidy’, whereas Boadway and Flatters (1982)
discuss intergovernmental transfers designed to address inefficiencies due to tax competition.
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hypothesis highlighted in the tax competition literature. In particular, Bénassy-Quéré
et al. (2007) show that high tax rates exist in the majority of EU-15 countries. Baldwin
and Krugman (2004) explain that economies of agglomeration support the existence
of high tax rates in such industrialized “core” regions. However, other authors (for
example, Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011) argue that jurisdictions, in addition to taxes, may
compete for mobile factors with non-tax instruments.
The following section reviews the studies in which taxes and infrastructure provision
are jointly employed to attract mobile production factors.
1.1.2 Multi-dimensional competition and coordination
In the same way that firms differentiate the quality of their products to relax price
competition, regions can avoid head-to-head tax competition by offering infrastructure
service that are differentiated by quality (Justman et al., 2002). Tiebout (1956) was
the first to suggest that competition between jurisdictions may promote efficiency if
citizens are able to sort themselves into jurisdictions composed of those with similar
preferences for public good provision. Keen and Marchand (1997) incorporate taxes,
public goods, and public inputs into their model. They show that tax competition may
lead not only to inefficient levels of aggregate public expenditure but also to systematic
inefficiencies in the composition of public expenditures. Epple and Soeg (1999) and
Hoyt (2001) analyze interjurisdictional competition in the quality of education services.
Justman et al. (2002) demonstrate that regions can benefit by offering infrastructure
services that are differentiated by quality, thus segmenting the market for industrial
location.
However, in the above mentioned papers, the different strategic variables (taxes and
public inputs) are related through a balanced budget. Wildasin (1991) argues that equi-
libria in fiscal competition games with two instruments related via a budget constraint
crucially depend on which instrument is set strategically. Consequently, if countries
interact in taxes, infrastructure provision is not a distinct strategic variable.
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As a matter of fact, Hauptmeier et al. (2012) analyze how governments set taxes and
infrastructure expenditures to affect investors’ choices. In this case, if one jurisdiction
cuts its tax rates, rival countries try to restore competitiveness by lowering their own
rates and increasing public investments. Moreover, if neighbor countries increase their
spending on local infrastructure, other governments react by strongly increasing their
own spending. The empirics confirm that local governments use both taxes and public
investments to compete for mobile capital.
Pieretti and Zanaj (2011) consider asymmetric competition between two unequally
sized countries that set taxes and infrastructure provision independently to attract cap-
ital. Imperfectly mobile firms are supposed to account for their home attachment. The
competing jurisdictions choose public investments in the first stage and set tax rates
in the second stage to maximize their respective net tax revenue. As a result, when
the mobility costs are low or moderate, each jurisdiction can only be attractive through
the supply of higher levels of public goods and not through lower taxes. However,
adopting a low-tax regime may only be a winning strategy if the mobility cost is high
enough. In contrast to the pure tax competition literature, this paper suggests that if
the cost of mobility is intermediate, small jurisdictions may attract international capital
without being tax havens by supplying a high level of public goods.
Zissimos and Wooders (2008) analyze how variation of requirements for public goods
across firmsmay bring about differentiation in public goods provision across countries.
Then, their model analyzes tax coordination. In their paper, competing governments
choose levels of infrastructure expenditures first and then set tax rates after having ob-
served infrastructure expenditures in the previous stage. Their objective is tomaximize
tax revenue net of infrastructure expenditures. The paper shows that the imposition of
minimum tax rates can be Pareto improving in terms of tax income. Setting aminimum
tax rate or a common tax rate can enhance efficiency.
In addition to tax coordination, many federal countries have adopted various equaliza-
tion schemes that allow central governments to address the issue of fiscal imbalances
across jurisdictions. Hindriks et al. (2008) investigate amodel of federation under fiscal
equalization, with two heterogeneous regions competing in capital income taxes and
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public investments. The federation implements a fiscal equalization scheme in which
regions share a proportion of their tax revenue. The paper shows that there is strategic
under-investment among regions, even in the absence of equalization, because each
region decides to under-invest to soften tax competition.
Zissimos and Wooders (2008) analyze the welfare implications of tax coordination
when jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure independently. However, these
authors assume that the level of public expenditures remain unchanged after that tax
coordination is introduced. This assumption ignores possible reactions in infrastruc-
ture expenditures following the decision to coordinate. In Chapters 4 and 5 we show
that removing this assumption plays a critical role in analyzing the welfare implica-
tions of tax coordination.
1.2 Overview
When jurisdictions are supposed to compete for mobile production factors through tax
incentives and non-tax instruments independently4, many insights based on classical
tax competition literature may be altered. This aspect is analyzed extensively in the
present dissertation.
The first part of the dissertation consists of two chapters that address the dynamic
aspects of multi-dimensional competition. Under dynamic competition, firms choose
their location dynamically in each period to maximize their respective profits. Chapter
2 develops a dynamic relocation rule of firms based on the home attachment principle
introduced by Mansoorian and Myers (1993). This rule is applied in Chapter 3, which
focuses on dynamic competition in taxes and public services among unequally sized
jurisdictions. We account for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are
more flexible in their decison-making than larger economies. However, small countries
may suffer from limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services. Con-
sequently, small and large countries behave asymmetrically when they compete for in-
4In this dissertation, non-tax instruments are not linked to taxes by budget constraints.
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ternationally mobile capital. This heterogeneity is analyzed within a differential game
framework. We demonstrate that in case of high capital mobility small economies may
collapse economically if public services are inefficiently provided. When capital mobil-
ity is very low, a small state’s economy always expands despite its limited institutional
capacity.
The second part of the dissertation includes three chapters that focus primarily on the
implication of tax coordination when jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure.
The desirability of tax coordination is analyzed in Chapter 4. The timing of the game
is considered in two different ways. When infrastructure decisions are less flexible
than tax policy, jurisdictions compete successively in two strategic variables. In the
first stage, governments non-cooperatively select infrastructure levels, and set the tax
rates in the second stage. When tax and infrastructure instruments can be viewed as
equally flexible, we model the competition using a simultaneous game. Two tax co-
ordination devices (a common tax rate and a minimum tax rate) are considered. We
assume that countries still compete in infrastructure after having coordinated their tax
policies. We demonstrate that tax coordination does not necessarily generate the wel-
fare effects often observed in pure tax competition literature. The reason is that the
decision to coordinate on tax rate induces a carry-over effect on infrastructure expen-
ditures. Moreover, we highlight that tax coordination is more likely to be detrimental
when countries can compete simultaneously in taxes and infrastructure, rather than
sequentially.
Then, we consider that tax coordination can be decided among a subset of countries
that forms a tax union. Chapter 5 investigates whether partial tax coordination bene-
fits the tax union (the insiders) and/or the outsiders. The member states of the union
coordinate tax policies but still compete in infrastructure provision. In addition, the
union as a whole competes in taxes and infrastructure with the rest of the world. We
demonstrate that partial tax coordination can harm both union members and non-
union members. This contrasts with the classical view that partial tax coordination
is Pareto improving.
The final chapter analyzes how social welfare is impacted by increasing the size asym-
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metry of countries when they compete in taxes and infrastructure. It appears that
increasing size asymmetry does not necessarily exacerbate the inefficiency of tax com-
petition. More precisely, if the degree of international openness is low (high), social
welfare decreases (increases) with size asymmetry.
10
Bibliography
[1] Baldwin R.E. and P. Krugman, 2004. Agglomeration, integration and tax harmo-
nization. European Economic Review 48, 1-23.
[2] Bénassy-Quéré A., N. Gobalraja and A. Trannoy, 2007. Tax and public input com-
petition. Economic policy, 22: 385-430.
[3] Broadway R. and J.F. Tremblay, 2011. Reassessment of the Tiebout model. Journal
of public economics.
[4] Bucovetsky S., 1991. Asymmetric Tax Competition, Journal of Urban Economics,
30: 167–181.
[5] Bucovetsky S. and Wilson J.D., 1991. Tax competition with two tax instruments.
Regional science and urban economics, 21: 333-350.
[6] Burbidge J. B. and G. M. Myers, 1994. Population mobility and tax competition.
Regional science and urban economics, 24: 441-459.
[7] Cardarelli R., 2002. A repeated interactions model of tax competition. Journal of
public economic theory, 4(1): 19-38.
[8] Coates D., 1993. Property tax competition in a repeated game. Regional science
and urban economics, 23: 111-119.
[9] Epple D. and H. Sieg, 1999. Estimating equilibrium models of local jurisdictions.
Journal of political economics, 107: 645-682.
11
[10] Hauptmeier S., F. Minttermaier and J. Rincke, 2012. Fiscal competition over taxes
and public inputs. Regional science and urban economics, 42: 407-419.
[11] Hindriks J., S. Peralta and S. Weber, 2008. Competing in taxes and investment
under fiscal equalization. Journal of public economics, 92: 2392-2402.
[12] Hoyt W. H., 1991. Competitive cities, congestion, and the Henry George theorem.
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 3(1): 69-93.
[13] Hoyt W. H., 2001. Product differentiation and public education. Journal of public
economic theory, 3(1): 69-93.
[14] Jensen R. and E. F. Toma, 1991. Debt in a model of tax competition. Regional sci-
ence and urban economics, 21: 371-392.
[15] Justman M., J.F. Thisse and T. V. Ypersele, 2002. Taking the bite out of fiscal com-
petition. Journal of urban economics, 52: 294-315.
[16] Kanbur, R., and M. Keen, 1993. Jeux Sans Frontières: Tax competition and tax co-
ordination when countries differ in size. American Economic Review, 83(4): 877–
893.
[17] Keen M. and M. Marchand, 1997. Fiscal competition and the pattern of public
spending. Journal of public economics, 66: 33-53.
[18] Konrad K. A., and G. Schjelderup, 1999. Fortress building in global tax competi-
tion. Journal of Urban Economics 46: 156–167.
[19] Krelove R., 1993. The persistence and inefficiency of property tax finance of local
public expenditures. Journal of public economics, 51: 415-435.
[20] Mansoorian A. and G.M. Myers, 1993. Attachment to home and efficient pur-
chases of population in a fiscal externality economy. Journal of Public Economics
52: 117-132.
[21] Oates W. E., 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
12
[22] Pieretti P. and S. Zanaj, 2011. On tax competition, public goods provision and
jurisdictions’ size. Journal of International Economics 84: 124-130.
[23] Tiebout C. M., 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of political eco-
nomic, 5: 416-424.
[24] Wellisch D., 1994. Interregional spillovers in the presence of perfect and imperfect
household mobility. Journal of public economics, 55: 167-184.
[25] Wildasin D.E., 1991. Some rudimetary ’duopolity’ theory. Regional Science and
Urban Economics 21: 393-421.
[26] Wildasin D., 2003. Fiscal competition in space and time. Journal of public eco-
nomics, 87: 2571-2588.
[27] Wildasin D., 2011. Fiscal competition for imperfectly-mobile labor and capital: A
comparative dynamic analysis. Journal of public economics 95: 1312-1321.
[28] Wilson J.D., 1995. Mobile labor, multiple tax instruments, and tax competition.
Journal of urban economics, 38: 333-356.
[29] Wilson J. D. and D. E. Wildasin, 1996. Imperfect mobility and local government
behavior in an overlapping-generations model. Journal of public economics, 60:
177-198.
[30] Wilson J. D. and D. E. Wildasin, 2004. Capital tax competition: bane or boon.
Journal of public economics, 88: 1065-1091.
[31] Wilson J. D., 1999. Theories of tax competition. National tax journal, 52(2): 269-
304.
[32] Wilson J.D., 1986. A theory of interregional tax competition. Journal of urban eco-
nomics, 19: 296-315.
[33] Wilson J.D., 1991. Tax competition with interregional differential in factor endow-
ments. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 21(3): 423-451.
13
[34] Zissimos B. and M. Wooders, 2008. Public good differentiation and the intensity
of tax competition. Journal of public economics, 92: 1105-1121.
[35] Zodrow G. R. and P. Mieszkowski, 1986. Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and
the underprovision of local public goods. Journal of urban economics, 19: 356-370.
14
Part I
Dynamic Multi-dimensional
Interjurisdictional Competition
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Chapter 2
An Extension of the Home-Attachment
Criteria under Dynamic Tax
Competition
2.1 Introduction
In1 their seminal paper dealing with tax and infrastructure competition, Zissimos and
Wooders (2008) observe that their static model is silent on how taxes evolve over time.
Actually, the lack of a dynamic setting exists for most contributions in the tax competi-
tion literature (see, for example, Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Kanbur and
Keen, 1993). Among the few prominent exceptions are the contributions of Wildasin
(2003, 2011). These papers analyze the dynamic process of competition for capital un-
der a time-invariant tax rate framework and demonstrate the importance of endoge-
nously determined adjustment costs. However, all firms are identical and don’t move
with the exception of a subset of inputs which are mobile between jurisdictions. Within
such a framework, if one firm, considered as a whole, would like to relocate to another
1This chapter is based on, An extension of the home-attachment criteria under dynamic tax competition, Y.
Han, P. Pieretti and B. Zou. Economics Letters (2013), Vol. 121, 508-510.
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jurisdiction, all the other firms would follow. When jurisdictions are symmetric, firms
are either spread equally across the different jurisdictions, or they all locate in only one
jurisdiction. Therefore, the existence of heterogeneous firms in competing regions is
essential to avoid the occurrence of corner situations.
An interesting way to introduce heterogeneity among firms is to assume that entrepre-
neurs are different in their attachment to home location. This idea was first introduced
by Mansoorian and Myers (1993) in fiscal competition and then applied by Ogura
(2006). In the same vein, empirical evidence suggests that there is significant home
bias in investment decisions (see, for example, Feldstein and Horioka,1980; French
and Porteba,1991; Tesar and Werner,1995). However, this bias is not limited to interna-
tional portfolios. For example, Figueiredo et al. (2002) show that there is a significant
advantage of the home region in the location choice of new industrial investments in
Portugal.
The home attachment criteria applies easily in a static tax competition model but re-
mains challenging in a dynamic context. The main problem comes from the ranking
of firms according to the home preference when there is repeated business relocation.
In this chapter we propose a way to update the location preference of firms when they
are able to move. Then we show how this extended rule can be applied to the study of
dynamic tax competition.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present a dy-
namic relocation rule basing on the home attachment principle. In Section 3 we apply
the dynamic ranking rule to a simple dynamic tax competition framework. Section 4
concludes and points to possible extensions of the setting.
2.2 A dynamic relocation rule
Consider two countries, 1 and 2, populated at time t with S1(t) and S2(t) firms re-
spectively. The two jurisdictions are represented on a segment [ S1(t); S2(t)]. The first
country extends from  S1(t) to the origin O(t); and the second, from O(t) to S2(t). We
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further assume that, in either country, firms are evenly spread (with unit density) on
their respective sub-segment according to their propensity to relocate abroad. As in
Ogura (2006), we assume that the population of investors is heterogeneous in the de-
gree of their attachment to home. In our setting, this means that the closer firms are lo-
cated to the extremes, the more they are attached to their current location. Conversely,
the closer firms are to the "border" O(t), the less they are attached to their territory and
the easier they are able to relocate abroad. Thus, we can characterize the firms’ types
in the following way. A firm of type2 1(t) 2 [ S1(t); O(t)] (with O(t) = 0; 8t ) located
in country 1 at time t, incurs a disutility of relocating abroad equal to the "distance"
between 1(t) and O(t). A firm of type 2(t) 2 [O(t); S2(t)] located in country 2 at time
t, incurs a disutility of moving abroad equal to the "distance" between O(t) and 2(t).
We now suppose that some firms can relocate abroad. Let us start at t = 0 and assume,
without loss of generality, that x(0) (< S1(0) ) firms of country 1move to country 2. At
period t = 1, firms located in country 1 are spread over the new interval [ S1(1); O(1)],
where S1(1) = S1(0) x(0), and firms located in country 2 are spread over [O(1); S2(1)],
where S2(1) = S2(0) + x(0).
How do the decisions to relocate modify firms’ attachment to their home location? We
first consider the firmswhich don’t move. Because country 1 suffers from capital flight,
we consider that this loss of attractiveness makes the remaining firms less attached to
their current location. For sake of simplification, we assume that the firms located in
jurisdiction 1 at time t = 1 reduce their home attachment by x(0) uniformly3. Put
differently, a firm of type 1(0) at time t = 0 which does not relocate will be at time
t = 1 of type 1(1) = 1(0)+ x(0);with 1(1) 2 [ S1(1); O(1)].
We observe the opposite effect in country 2 which, contrary to country 1; improves
its attractiveness to foreign firms. We therefore assume that the attachment to home
increases uniformly by a constant x(0) in jurisdiction 2. In other words, a firm of type
2Note that, by definition, 1(t) is negatively signed.
3We make this choice for sake of simplicity. However, a more complex preference revision could be
proposed. We could assume that only a subset of firms revise their preferences, or that, the extent to
which firms update their preferences would increase with their past attachment to home.
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2(0) at time t = 0, which does not move its activity abroad, will be at time t = 1 of
type 2(1) = 2(0)+ x(0)with 2(1) 2 [O(1) + x(0); S2(1)].
How do the moving firms modify their preference relative to the new location? A
natural attitude to expect is that the more (less) the moving firms are attached to their
past location, the less (more) they will be attached to the new location. In other words,
for each firm of type 2(1) 2 [O(1); O(1) + x(0)], we write 2(1) = 1(0)+ x(0) with
1(0) 2 [O(0)  x(0); O(0)].
More generally, we can formulate the following rule. For all (t) 2 [ S1(t); S2(t)], we
define (t) = (t t) + x(t t), where4
(t) =
(
1(t) 2 [ S1(t); O(t)]
2(t) 2 [O(t); S2(t)]
;
where x(t) > 0 if firms move from country 1 to country 2 and x(t) < 0 if firms relocate
in the opposite direction. Note that O(t) = 0 implies S1(t) = S1(t t)  x(t t) and
S2(t) = S2(t t) + x(t t).
2.3 Application
In this section we illustrate how the relocation rule that we just highlighted applies to
dynamic capital tax competition. To this end, we use the above spatial framework and
normalize the total number of firms to one. It follows that S1(t) = S(t) and S2(t) =
1  S(t). At time t, the net profit of a firm located in country i = 1; 2 is given by i(t) =
i(t)   i(t), where  i(t) is a unit capital tax paid in country i.
At time t, a firm of type 1(t) located in country 1 considers staying at home or in-
vesting her physical capital abroad. If the entrepreneur decides to stay at home, the
profit is given by 1(t) = 1(t)    1(t). If she invests abroad, her profit becomes
2(t) = 2(t)  2(t) k d(t), where k is a unit moving cost, d(t) is the distance between
1(t) and the origin and k  d(t) is the total relocation cost. The marginal entrepreneur
4In discrete time we havet = 1:
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01(t)who is indifferent between investing abroad and staying at home verifies the con-
dition 1(t)   1(t) = 2(t)   2(t)  k  d0(t). Conversely, if firms move from country 2
to country 1, the marginal condition becomes, 1(t)    1(t)   k  d0(t) = 2(t)    2(t).
For sake of simplicity, we set i(t) = ai (i = 1; 2) and A = a1   a2 < k. Further, we
consider the model in discrete time.
Consequently, we obtain
x(t;  1;  2) =
1
k
( 1(t)   2(t)  A) ;
with x(t) = d0(t) > 0 if country 2 attracts capital from country 1 and x(t) =  d0(t) < 0
if firms move in the opposite direction. The jurisdictions compete in taxes to attract
mobile firms. At each period t they set their respective tax rates which maximize their
respective tax revenue defined by
B1(t) = [S(t)  x(t)]  1(t) and B2(t) = [1  S(t) + x(t)]  2(t):
Wenowdefine themotion law for Si(t) (i = 1; 2), and show how it relates to the ranking
rule we defined above. First note that according to this rule the number of firms which
move at time t  1 are related to the firms’ characteristics in the following way
x(t  1) = (t)  (t  1):
Knowing that S1(t) = S1(t 1) x(t 1) and S2(t) = S2(t 1)+x(t 1) and substituting
x(t  1), we finally get the motion equation for each country i = 1; 2,
Si(t)  Si(t  1) = ( 1)i [(t)  (t  1)] :
The sequential update of S1(t) and S2(t) relative to x(t  1)modifies at each round the
jurisdictions’ objective functions B1(t) and B2(t), which in turn impacts the taxation
strategies and the flow of relocations. We now consider tax competition as noncooper-
ative tax setting in an intertemporal environment. The dynamics unfold in the follow-
ing way. At each period, the jurisdictions set a tax rate which is the best response to
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the rival’s strategic decision. However, this equilibrium is temporary as long as the lo-
cational preference changes at each round. Consequently, at each period t, the solution
of the game yields the temporary equilibrium tax rates
 1(t) =
1
3
(A+ k) +
k
3
S(t) and  2(t) =
1
3
(2k   A)  k
3
S(t):
The dynamics of S(t) and x(t) are given by S(t) = 5
3
S(t 1)  A+k
3k
and x(t) = 1
3
x(t 1).
It follows that the game tendsmonotonically5 to a rest point, because x(t)! 0 if t!1.
Consequently, the long run tax rates will be  1 =
1
2
(A+ k) and  2 =
1
2
(k   A) and the
size variables, S1 =
1
2k
(A+ k) and S2 =
1
2k
(k   A) with k > A.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we develop a setting which can be used to study dynamic tax (and/or
infrastructure) competition when firms can change their production location over time.
To this aim, we adapt the home-attachment criteria of Mansoorian and Myers (1993)
and Ogura (2006) to fit into a dynamic framework. Then we illustrate our extended
rule within a dynamic tax competition model. Although this model is based on sim-
plifying assumptions, more complex cases can be developed. For example, instead of
assuming that all the firms have the same production function, we could consider het-
erogeneous technologies. Our setting can be used for different purposes. For example,
a dynamic game similar to the one of Han et al. (2012), in which jurisdictions compete
in taxes and infrastructure, could be developed to answer the question of Zissimos
and Wooders (2008) about how tax rates change over time. Another issue would be
to explore under which conditions dynamic tax and infrastructure competition would
allow convergence across unequally developed countries.
5More precisely, this is the case along a saddle-point path.
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric Competition among Nation
States: A Differential Game Approach
3.1 Introduction
Small states1 generally suffer from limited access to capital and labor resources, both
in amount and in variety. Foreign production factors can be an important way to fill
in this gap. Foreign direct investments (in short, FDI, hereafter) can contribute signifi-
cantly to the development of small states (Read, 2008). In fact, small economies tend to
have high level of access to private foreign capital as a ratio of total capital formation
(Streeten, 1993). Indeed, using data from the World Bank, Figure 1 suggests that the
ratio of FDI flows to the gross fixed capital formation is higher in small countries (i.e.,
population less than two million2) than in large countries (i.e., population in excess of
1This chapter is based on, Asymmetric competition among nation states: a differential game approach, Y.
Han, P. Pieretti, S. Zanaj and B. Zou. (Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Public Economics)
2Our data set contains 51 countries with population less than 2 million. This represents 72% of all
the existing "small" countries. An exhaustive description cannot be provided due to a lack of relevant
information.
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30 million3). Moreover, the economic well-being of small countries is positively corre-
lated with the ratio of FDIs. The data in Figure 1 indicate that small countries above
the average line, such as Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus or Estonia, exhibit a high level of
per capita GDP, whereas small countries below this threshold have a lower level of per
capita GDP. This is confirmed in Figure 2, which suggests that a direct relationship ex-
ists between the level of GDP per capita and foreign investments4 in small economies.
In the cluster of larger countries, however, this relationship is hardly apparent. Coun-
tries, such as Poland, Italy, Turkey, India and Spain appear above the threshold in
Figure 1, whereas the USA, Ukraine, Nepal, Greece among others, are situated below
it5.
Given these facts, this chapter analyzes the impact of foreign investment flows on the
economic performance of a small country competing internationally for mobile pro-
duction factors. In this context, we investigate the conditions by which the economies
of such countries can be viable, or even expand, in the long term. To that end, we
develop a dynamic framework to study how a small country attracts foreign capital
through two policy instruments, namely taxes and public services6.
3Our data set of countries with population in excess of 30 million is exhaustive. It contains 41 coun-
tries.
4Note that, we have not controlled for other determinants of per capita GDP; for example, the avail-
ability of natural resources. Taking into account oil reserves and the recent increase in oil prices would
explain the position of Qatar or Brunei in our figures.
5The ambiguous role of FDIs on the economic performance of countries is documented in the litera-
ture (see, for example Alfaro et al. 2004).
6These public services contribute to the domestic attractiveness of private capital, as they are sup-
posed to enhance private productivity. Examples of this are spending for the operation andmaintenance
of power and transportation infrastructures, operating costs of universities, but also the enforcement of
property rights and the provision of capital market, labor and environmental regulations. It follows that
countries’ attractiveness may also be due to the quality of their institutions. In the Oxford Handbook
of Entrepreneurship (2007), it is argued that the abundance of entrepreneurs in a country depends on
the existence of regulations, property rights, accounting standards and disclosure requirements, among
other factors. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been a surge of national and cross-country studies
relating economic development to institutions, especially institutions affecting capital market develop-
ment and functionality (see, for example, La Porta et al.,1997).
25
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on two competing countries of uneven size. In
this study, size is defined as number of capital-owners in a respective country and
these capital owners are simultaneously entrepreneurs and workers. By adopting this
approach, our model focuses on the economic size of a country.
The dynamic aspect of international competition is addressed by a differential game
framework in which the strategic behavior of the small country differs from that of
its larger rival. We account for the widely recognized characteristic that small states
are more flexible in their political decision making than much larger countries (see, in
particular, Streeten, 1993).
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We thus assume that the small country adopts a Markovian feed-back behavior (i.e.,
the policy variables are continuously reset in response to the dynamics of the states
of the world), whereas the larger country chooses an open-loop rule (i.e., the policy
variables are set only once at the initial time). We also acknowledge that small size
is associated with handicaps, as, small economies are generally characterized by lim-
ited institutional capacity in the provision of public goods (Commonwealth Secretariat,
2000) relative to large countries. Finally, we assume that the capital owners living in
both countries have heterogeneous attitudes toward their attachment to home. Thus,
they incur costs related to moving abroad. The extend of these costs depends on their
attitudes toward their countries. Additionally, their decision to relocate their capital is
affected by capital taxation and by productivity-enhancing public services.
The main results of the chapter can be summarized as follows. First, the model shows
that GDP, in particular the GDP per capita, of the small country increases with the
flow of FDIs, which is consistent with the facts presented above. Moreover, the long-
run solutions show that the economy of the small country can expand, shrink or even
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collapse. In this context, two cases can be distinguished: one exhibits high interna-
tional openness and another exhibits low international openness. The fundamental
difference between these cases is that the small country will only experience economic
collapse if capital mobility is high (i.e., high international openness). However, higher
efficiency in the provision of public services can partially countervail this effect by de-
creasing the likelihood of collapse. In the second case, when capital mobility is low,
international competition for capital can eventually reduce the size of the small econ-
omy without provoking its collapse. If capital mobility is very low, the model shows
that international competition tends to expand the economy of the small country. We
also assess the extent to which flexibility is beneficial to the small country, given that
it suffers from limited institutional capacity. By comparing the Markovian and open-
loop outcomes, we find that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate- the
likelihood of a small economy collapse. Finally, we show that the benefit of flexibil-
ity increases in tandem with the inefficiency of public service provision and with the
degree of international openness in the small country.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we
provide a dynamic counterpart to previous static papers in which countries compete
with two instruments7. Following Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model, there has been
a growing body of literature on the joint role of taxes and public inputs in attract-
ing mobile production factors. For example, Zissimos and Wooders (2008) analyze
how the provision of public goods designed to reduce the production cost of private
firms is able to relax international tax competition between governments of equal size.
Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007) provide an empirical analysis of the impact of taxes and
public goods on the allocation of private capital. They find that both corporate taxes
and public capital contribute significantly to inward FDIs. Pieretti and Zanaj (2011)
propose a two-stage game in which both a small and large jurisdiction compete for
capital using taxes and public goods as policy variables. These contributions are, how-
ever, static and thus unable to provide insights into dynamic outcomes. Differential
7An exception is Wildasin (2003, 2011) who studies tax competition within an explicitly dynamic
framework. In addition to other differences to our paper, he does not consider competition in a non-tax
instrument.
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games have already been applied to oligopolistic competition (Dockner and Jorgensen,
1984, Karp and Perloff, 1993, Cellini and Lambertini, 2004); however, few studies have
applied differential games to tax competition. For example, Coates (1993) deals with
the issue of property tax competition and partially analyzes the open-loop equilibrium
of a dynamic game.8 Secondly, by assuming that small countries are more flexible in
taking decisions than their larger rivals but at a higher institutional cost as explained
above, we account for behavioral and institutional asymmetries which, to the best of
our knowledge, are not considered in the traditional tax competition literature.
We assume the economic magnitude expressed in terms of productive resources can
vary endogenously as a consequence of public policy and international competition,
while the political size is fixed. Similar to our model, the contribution of de la Croix
and Dottori (2008) is also concerned with the collapse of a community. To explain the
tragedy of Easter Island, these authors show how a closed system can collapse as a
result of non-cooperative bargaining between clans. The context and the methodology
of their paper is, however, different from ours, given that they use an overlapping
generations model in which people live for two periods and compete in fertility rates.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section models the dynamic competition
between two countries of asymmetric size. In Section 3, we derive long-run solutions
and Section 4 analyzes the long-run conditions of a small country. The importance
of flexibility in small economies is assessed in Section 5 and Section 6 presents the
conclusion.
3.2 The model
Suppose that the world is composed of two countries (regions) with unequal popula-
tions. Country size may be defined by population, area, or national income (Streeten,
1993). In this study, population, rather than area, is used to define country size. More
precisely, size is defined with respect to the number of capital owners who populate
8As mentioned by Cardarelli (2002).
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the country and these capital owners are simultaneously entrepreneurs and workers.
By adopting this approach, our model identifies a country by the size of its economy.
Furthermore, capital owners (and their associated activities) are free to relocate to the
neighbor country at any point in time. At time t = 0; capital flows have not yet taken
place, so the population size in each country coincides with its native population.
At t = 0; the population of jurisdictions is evenly distributed with unit density on the
interval [ S1(0); S2(0)]. The small country extends from  S1(0) to the origin 0; and the
rest of the world extends from 0 to S2(0). It follows that the small economy has a size
of S1(0) , and the rest of the world has a size of S2(0), with S1(0) < S2(0). We assume
that the total number of firms is constant over time and is normalized to one. Thus, for
any future time t  0, S1(t) = S(t) and S2(t) = 1  S(t).
Entrepreneurs Each citizen is endowed with one unit of capital which is combined
with her labor to establish a firm. Therefore, all citizens are self-employed entrepre-
neurs. Throughout the rest of the paper, we thus use firms and entrepreneurs inter-
changeably. The firms are distributed at their respective sub-interval according to their
disposition to establish a firm outside of their home location. As in Ogura (2006), we
assume that this population of entrepreneurs is heterogeneous in the degree of their
attachment to the home country.9 Within the model, we dictate that the closer entre-
preneurs are located to extremes of the interval, the more they are attached to their
current location. Conversely, the closer that firms are to the border 0, the less they are
attached to their territory, and the easier it will be for them to relocate abroad.10 This
means that a firm of type 1 2 [ S1(0); 0] located at t = 0 in the home country incurs a
disutility of relocating abroad equal to kd, where d is the distance 11 between 0 and 1.
The coefficient k represents the unit cost of moving capital abroad and can also be in-
terpreted as the degree of international openness. In the following we argue that firms’
location preferences change with t. Consequently we can characterize the firms’ types
9This characteristic was first considered in the fiscal competition research of Mansoorian and Myers
(1993).
10For reasons of simplicity, we assume that firms can only relocate to their neighboring jurisdiction.
11It follows that d =  1.
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in a more general way. A firm of type 1(t) 2 [ S1(t); O(t)] (with O(t) = 0; 8t ) located
in country 1 at time t, incurs a disutility of relocating abroad equal to d(t) = O(t) 1(t)
and a firm of type 2(t) 2 [O(t); S2(t)] located in country 2 at time t, incurs a disutility
of moving abroad equal to d0(t) = 2(t) O(t).
As in Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we assume that each firm produces q + ai (i = 1; 2)
units of a final good, where q is the private component of (gross) productivity12. The
fraction ai of the produced good depends on the public input supplied by the home
(foreign) jurisdiction.13 Note that the product Si  (q + ai) represents the total output or
GDP produced in country i = 1; 2. This implies that q + ai is the per capita output in a
respective country. The total output is sold in a competitive (world) market at a given
price normalized to one. Thus, we suppose that both countries have equal access to a
common market.14 This also implies that the smaller jurisdiction does not suffer from
a reduced home market. We further consider that the unit production cost is constant
and equal to zero without loss of generality. Each entrepreneur pays a tax on capital
which is denoted by Ti (i = 1; 2) and levied in the country i = 1; 2.
15
12The technology we use can be deduced from a CES production function, yi(t) =
(q + ai(t)) [K
 + (1  )L]) 1 with  2 (0; 1), where each person supplies L units of labor and owns
K units of capital. If labor and capital are given and uniform across, we can normalize L and K to one.
Consequently, the per capita production function reduces to yi(t) = q + ai(t):
13A public input satisfies the local public good characteristics; that is, it is jointly used without ri-
valry by firms located within the same jurisdiction. It follows that the benefits and costs of these goods
only accrue at the jurisdictional level. As in Zissimoss and Wooders (2008), we abstract congestion
costs . Incorporating congestion into the model would complicate our framework without qualitatively
improving the results. Moreover, if public input represents immaterial goods as laws and regulations
(e.g., protecting intellectual property and, specifying accurate rules for dispute resolution), the lack of
congestion in our model is justified by the particular nature of these goods.
14Recent empirical work (Guerin, 2006) demonstrates that the distance is economically more signifi-
cant for FDI than trade, indicating that there are significant information costs to FDI in particular. Con-
sequently, it is likely that trade, being less sensitive to distance, occurs among more countries than FDIs.
In our model we account for this fact by assuming that foreign direct investments take place among two
jurisdictions but trade occurs among many countries.
15Given that each entrepreneur invests exactly one unit of capital in our model, the total tax will be Ti
(i = 1; 2).
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The temporal perspective of the setting described above is as follows. For each period
t 2 [t;+1) and for any t > 0, governments update their choices in terms of the
public services and taxes offered.
Suppose that an entrepreneur of type 1(t) is located in country 1 at date t and con-
siders staying at home or investing her physical capital abroad. If she decides not to
move 16, her profit is given by17
1(t) = q + a1(t)  T1(t): (3.1)
If she invests abroad, her profit becomes
2(t) = q + a2(t)  T2(t)  kd(t):
It follows that the marginal entrepreneur of country 1 who is indifferent between in-
vesting abroad and staying at home verifies the condition
a1(t)  T1(t) = a2(t)  T2(t)  kd(t):
Conversely, if firms move from country 2 to country 1, the marginal condition be-
comes, a1(t)  T1(t)  kd0(t) = a2(t)  T2(t).
Consequently, we obtain
x(t; a1; a2; T1; T2) =
a2(t)  T2(t)
k
  a1(t)  T1(t)
k
: (3.2)
16At each period t, the firms decide whether it is in their best interest to move their business. More
exactly, they choose their best location given that tax rates and infrastructure expenditures are time-
variant. We could assume that firms are forward-looking and able to anticipate the future choices of the
other agents (firms and governments). However, it is possible to show, already in a three-period version
of our model, that multiple solutions are very likely to appear (the details of this model are available
on request). If this is the case, firms’ decisions will be time inconsistent. This problem is drastically
emphasized in continuous time. To be able to solve the model anyhow, we have to impose limiting
conditions. Therefore, we assume that firms are myopic in their location choices.
17For the sake of simplicity, we consider that q is such that the profit of each firm is positive for all
equilibrium levels of public goods and taxes.
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In other words, the large country attracts capital (x(t) = d0(t) > 0) from the smaller
jurisdiction if the net gain of investing abroad, a2(t)  T2(t); is higher than the net gain
of staying at home, a1(t)   T1(t) after taking into account the mobility cost kx(t). If
x(t) =  d0(t) < 0, capital moves from the large jurisdiction to the smaller one.
The motion equation of the size of the small country’s economy S(t) is given by
_S(t) =  x = a1(t)  T1(t)
k
  a2(t)  T2(t)
k
: (3.3)
The ranking of firms according to their home attachment is fundamental for determin-
ing the migration flow x(t) at date t: However, this ranking at date t is altered by the
relocations of firms at date t   t. This occurs because of two reasons. First, the en-
trepreneurs who relocate their activity will have to value their attachment to the new
location. Second, the firms which do not move will change their attachment prefer-
ences because the relative attractiveness of the competing countries has changed, as
demonstrated by the relocations that take place. Accordingly, we need a rule clarifying
how the preference ranking changes at each date.
It is legitimate to assume that the firm owners will feel less attached to the new location
the more they were attached to the country they come from. On the other hand, firms
that remain in a country suffering a loss of activity are likely to be less attached to their
current location because of its reduced economic attractiveness. The opposite effect is
likely to occur in the country that benefits from new firm locations.
In the following we apply the following rule.
For the firms that do not move, attachment to home will increase in proportion to the
level of inward business locations and decrease in proportion to the level of outward
relocations. For example, if at date t country 1 suffers from capital flight, the firms
still located in jurisdiction 1 reduce their attachment to the current location by x(t)
uniformly18. More precisely, all the firms of type 1(t) 2 [ S1(t); O(t)] at date t will be
of type 1(t+t) = 1(t)+x(t) at date t+t. For the firms which move from country
1 to country 2; we assume that the more they were attached to their former location
18This linear form is used for simplicity.
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the less they will be attached to the new one. In other words, for each firm of type
2(t +t) 2 [O(t+t); O(t+t) + x(t)] at date t +t, we write 2(t +t) = 1(t)+
x(t) with19 1(t) 2 [O(t)  x(t); O(t)].
It is important to note that the updated location preferences at date t that result from
the relocation flow x(t   t) of date t   t determine the outflow x(t), which will
induce a further preference update at t +t, and so on... It follows that this updating
process is the basic driving force behind the dynamics of the model.
Governments Adopting a public-choice perspective, we posit that the governments
maximize tax revenue.20 To this end, countries compete simultaneously by using taxes
and public services to attract entrepreneurs, and firms decide where to locate based on
these government policies. We suppose that the effective (net) tax revenue collected
by the governments does not coincide with the gross amount of tax revenue collected.
Following Vaillancourt (1989) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992), tax collection is
costly due to the administration, monitoring and enforcing procedures associated with
it (Kenny and Winer, 2006). If the marginal cost of collecting taxes rises, then the net
tax revenue R(t) at time t is a concave function of the collected taxes. For tractability
reasons, the net tax revenue will be given by Ri =
p
SiTi.
The instantaneous objective function of government i(i = 1; 2) is thus given by the
19More generally, we can formulate the following rule. For all (t) 2 [ S1(t); S2(t)], we define (t) =
(t t) + x(t t), where
(t) =
(
1(t) 2 [ S1(t); O(t)]
2(t) 2 [O(t); S2(t)]
;
where x(t t) > 0 if firms move from country 1 to country 2 and x(t t) < 0 if firms relocate in the
opposite direction.
20This assumption should not be interpreted in the classical sense given by Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) and applied to Leviathan governments. We do not consider here that regulators are self-interested
governments. We simply assume that collected taxes are used to finance productive public services but
also public goods that do not directly affect the productivity of firms, such as green spaces, swimming
pools, and security bodies.
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following:
wi(Ti; ai) =
p
SiTi   i
2
a2i ; (3.4)
where the second term is the cost of providing public inputs, which is assumed quadratic,
whereas i is a country specific efficiency parameter. Indeed, the higher the value of
i, the higher the unit and marginal costs of providing public service.
The key focus of this paper is the long-run behavior of small states. To this end, we
highlight two opposing features of small open economies.
First, according to the Commonwealth Secretariat (2000), the public sector of mini-
states generally suffers from limited institutional capacity.21 Moreover, it may be dif-
ficult for small states to recruit high-quality civil servants given their limited pool of
candidates (Streeten, 1993). These factors can reduce the efficiency and increase the
unit costs for the provision of public services (Briguglio,1998). To account for these
facts, we assume that 1   > 2. Normalizing 2 to 1; we impose  > 1. It follows
that  represents the inefficiency of the small country relatively to the large one.22
However, small size is a source of more responsive decision-making in a changing
economic environment. This can be the case for different reasons. First, small com-
munities are intrinsically more able to reach a consensus on policy issues. This idea
has long been put forward by philosophers and political scientists as acknowledged in
Alesina (2003). Several economists (for example, Kuznets, 1960; Alesina and Spolaore,
1997; Streeten, 1993) recognize that small-sized communities display a high degree of
political homogeneity. In particular, Streeten (1993) suggests that problems related to
collective action can be solved more easily in small countries, whereas larger juris-
dictions are not able or not willing to attain this degree of flexibility in their decision
21In small states, the median wage bill of the public sector as a proportion of GDP is 31 percent,
whereas the ratio is 21 percent in large developing countries (Commonwealth Secretariat and World
Bank, 2000).
22To be consistent, the parameter  should be inversely correlated with the size of the small country.
Taking into account this feature would however complicate the analysis without important additional
insight. Therefore, we shall assume that the small country is tiny enough to consider  as given. For
that reason we assume that the size S1 is bounded from above by S where S <
1
2 :
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making. It follows that, mobilization around a common effort should be easier. For
example, Kuznets (1960) notes that one advantage of small states is to have small and
more cohesive populations, which allows them to adapt better to change. In the same
vein, Armstrong and Read (1995) recognize that smallness facilitates greater single-
mindedness and focus on economic policy-making and a more rapid and effective re-
sponse to exogenous change. Indeed, reforming existing laws or passing new ones
takes much longer in large and diversified economies, where any change in the status
quo requires long negotiations involving a large variety of interest groups.
Another reason of higher adaptability in the decision-making is that small countries
are specialized in a handful of sectors. Thus the absence of a wide range of lobbyists
makes the parliament and the entire administrative body much more responsive.
Finally, small developed economies have to adapt more quickly to a changing environ-
ment because they are highly open to the rest of the world and thereby, subject to more
volatile business cycles than larger countries. Consequently, responsiveness to external
shocks is a question of economic survival. Rodrik (1998) demonstrates that highly open
countries and thus small countries have proportionally larger governments in order to
mitigate the exposure to the insecurities generated by extreme openness. According
to Katzenstein (2003) what really matters politically regarding small economies is their
perceived (external) vulnerability. He notes that, "Perceived vulnerability generated
an ideology of social partnership that acted like a glue for the corporatist politics of
the small European states” (Katzenstein, 2003, p.11). Moreover, because of their high
exposure to international shocks, they created relatively robust welfare states in order
to reach political bargains. In other words, small economies achieve social cohesion
through redistribution policies.
To capture the just highlighted concept of flexibility, we assume that the large juris-
diction commits to a policy path that was adopted at the beginning of the game (i.e.,
open-loop strategy), whereas policy-makers in the small jurisdiction adopt a Markov-
ian feed-back strategy.
Thismixed representation offers a convenient way ofmodeling differences in flexibility
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of decision making (Dockner et al., 2000). Although small in a political sense, the mini-
state can grow larger as a result of sustained capital inflows. The small country’s size
could thus exceed a critical threshold that would cause the large country to react more
aggressively by also adopting a Markovian strategy. To rule out such a behavioral
change, we assume that the size of the small economywill remain tiny enough. In other
words, we assume that the size S(t) is bounded from above and impose S(t)  S < 1
2
,
for any t  0.
The dynamic objective-functions of the competing jurisdictions are respectively23
J1 = max
a1;T1
Z +1
0
e rtw1(T1(S; t); a1(S; t))dt; (3.5)
J2 = max
a2;T2
Z +1
0
e rtw2(T2(t); a2(t))dt; (3.6)
where r is the discount rate of the public decision-makers, which should reflect the
degree of impatience of the population. Given that there is no evidence that this rate is
dependent on the size of a population, we accept that r is common to both jurisdictions.
3.3 Steady states and the long-run policy mix
As explained above, we assume that the small jurisdiction adopts a Markovian policy
setting, and its larger rival chooses open-loop strategies when designing its optimal
decision path. The long run solutions of the above dynamic system are highlighted in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For any given parameters k; r; , there exists a Nash equilibrium characterized
23Similar to Barro (1990), we consider that the government provides flows of public services. It follows
that the public service provision will be treated as a control variable.
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by the following interior steady state
S^ =
(kr) 
3
2
6
p
2
 p
2

  1
!
+
2
3
; (3.7)
ba1 = 1
2

1
kr
 1
2
; bT1 = krbS; ba2 = 1
2

1
2kr
 1
2
; bT2 = 2kr(1  bS); (3.8)
with the costate variables b1 = 12  kr  12 ; b2 =  12   k2r 12 . In the state space of the dynamic
system, it is locally asymptotically stable24. It follows that the long run policy mix of country
i(i = 1; 2) is given by the pair (bai; bTi):
Wewant now that the steady state size of the small country’s economy remains smaller
than 1
2
. This means that S^ < 1
2
requires that k < k =
 
1
2
 1
3 1
r
and  >  =
p
2
1 p2(kr) 32
.
It is convenient to show that the long-run per capita GDP ( ba1 + q) of the small country
increases with S^.25 Given that S^ is positively related to the FDI inflows, our model
is consistent with the stylized fact highlighted in Figure 2, which shows that the per
capita output of small economies improves with inward foreign investments. This pos-
itive relationship results from infrastructure expenditures that impact the productivity
of firms and, thus, improves the attractiveness of the location to foreign investments.
Proposition 2 The smaller economy always undercuts the rival’s tax rate but provides less
infrastructure services.
Indeed, it is readily verified that ba2   ba1 = 14  p2   2q 1kr > 0 for  > p2 andbT2   bT1 = kr 2  3bS > 0, given that bS < 12 . In other words, the small economy
will always be tax competitive but the public services it provides will never be at-
tractive to investors. This result is consistent with the literature on tax competition
24We present the convergence path in the Appendix A.2.
25The steady-state value a^1 written as a function of S^ is a^1 = 3kr(S^   23 ) + 12 ( 12kr )
1
2 . It follows that
@a^1
@S^
> 0 is always true.
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among economies of uneven size (Bucovetsky, 1991, Wilson, 1991,Kanbur and Keen,
1993, Trandel, 1994), which demonstrates that the benefit of smallness translates into
the ability to undercut the tax rates of larger countries. This means that the small
country will never be able to tax more than its large rival, which contrasts with some
static models on competition in taxes and infrastructure (Hindriks et al., 2008, Pieretti
and Zanaj, 2011). The reason is that the small country has a relative disadvantage in
providing infrastructure services due to its limited public capacity.
It appears that, the less efficient the small country is in providing public services, the
more it will lower its tax rate. Indeed, it is easy to see that ba2   ba1 and bT2   bT1 rise with
. It is interesting to note that increasing international openness (lower k) increases the
expenditure gap and the tax gap between the competing countries. Thus, the higher
the capital mobility, the more the small country will be inclined to undercut the tax rate
of its rival.
Finally, if the long-run solutions have to guarantee non-negative net budget constraints
of both economies26, the following two conditions must hold. Either (a) k > k  k
with k = ( 1
32
)
1
3
1
r
, or (b) k verifies k < k  k, with k =   1
50
 1
3 1
r
and  satisfies  <
  , with  = 1
2
p
2 16(kr) 32
. The long run budget constraint of the large country
will be satisfied if bw1  0, because there are relatively less stringent conditions on
the parameters of the large country27. It is not excluded that the competing countries
may issue temporarily debt to fund their infrastructure expenditures. This raises the
question whether the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied in both countries. In
the Appendix we prove that the present value of net revenues in country i is positive
if the steady state net revenue in country i is positive( bwi > 0; i = 1; 2).
26The long run net budget of the small and the large countries are bw1( bT1;ba1) = 16(kr) 32  18p2+124kr andbw2( bT2;ba2) = 5 8p2+16p2(kr) 323 , respectively.
27It also appears that bS 2  0; 12 in the cases (a) and (b).
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3.4 Will small states survive in the long run?
In this section, we focus our attention on the conditions under which the production
potential of the small economy will expand (1
2
> S^ > S(0) ), shrink (S^ < S(0) ) or
even collapse (S^ = 0).28Two cases can be considered according to the degree of capital
mobility.
Case 1 High degree of international openness: k < k < k.
In this case, the survival of the small economy depends on its relative efficiency in
providing public services. Two sub-cases can be distinguished: one in which capital
mobility is very high, i.e., k < k < ks with29ks =
1
2 [2 + S(0)])
2
3
1
r
, and a second one in
which capital mobility is moderately high, i.e., ks < k < k. In the first sub-case, it is
readily verified that the small economy expands in the long run, bS > S(0), if  < .
However, if the relative efficiency of provision of public services in the small economy
is too low (i.e., if  > ), it will collapse. Furthermore, as the mobility cost approaches
its lower bound k, the small country is more likely to collapse. This occurs because the
small economy has to lower its taxes to such an extent that it can no longer sustain its
public expenditures ( bw1 < 0). There are two extreme outcomes in the long-run. Either
the small economy expands, or collapses. Therefore, if it shrinks, it must collapse.
This extreme scenario changes in the second sub-case (see Figure 3). According to
the values taken by , the small economy can expand, collapse and shrink without
collapsing. If  < s with s =
p
2
1 6p2[ 2
3
 S(0)](kr)
3
2
, it will expand, and if  > , it will
collapse. For an intermediate efficiency value, i.e., s <  < , the small country will
shrink but still survive.
The following proposition can then be stated:
28We impose (see proof in Appendix A.3) that S(t)  S < 12 . If so,  would depend on the upper
bound of S. Thus, (S) =
p
2
1+6
p
2(S  2
3
)(kr)
3
2
, in which S is decreasing.
29It is readily verified that ks < k if 0 < S(0) < 12 .
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Proposition 3 Assume that international openness is high. The small country’s economy can
expand if it is relatively efficient in providing public services. Otherwise, its economy will
shrink or even collapse in the long run.
In a world of mobile capital, a small economy may have difficulty surviving even if it
is able to adapt to change more quickly than larger countries. This can occur because
the efficient provision of public services and capital mobility are crucial to generating
the resources necessary to afford further public amenities. In fact, the model shows
that below a given threshold, rising capital mobility causes the small economy to cut
its taxes to such an extent that its budgetary resources vanish. It follows that small
states, but especially micro-states, can secure their status in a global economy if their
public sectors provide public services with sufficient efficiency and if their tax rates are
more favorable than those of larger countries. At best, this is a necessary condition for
attracting foreign capital, or at least, surviving.
Case 2 Low degree of international openness: k > k > k.
In this case, the relative inefficiency of the provision of public services can no longer
lead to the collapse of an economy because budget resources are not constrained. For-
mally, the limit value  tends to1 if k approaches k. This is in marked contrast with
the first case, as - in this case- a low degree of financial openness makes capital more
captive and provides sufficient tax revenues to cover public expenditures. At worst,
the economy of the small country can contract (0 < bS < S(0)). This occurs if bk > k > k
and  > s, with bk = ( 1
8[2 3S(0)])2 )
1
3
1
r
. However, if mobility is very low, i.e., k > k > bk,
the small economy will attract foreign capital and thus expand. Surprisingly, this sce-
nario occurs independently of the level of inefficiency.
We conclude with the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assume that international openness is low (k > k > k). The small country’s
economic size never collapses but may shrink if the degree of international openness is not
sufficiently low. In this case, the survival of the economy is independent of the efficiency of
public service provision ().
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We provide a summary illustration of the different cases with respect to the parameter
values of k and  in Figure 3.
Figure 3 : The evolution of the small country’s economic potential according to the
mobility cost (k) and the degree of public inefficiency ().
3.5 How important is flexibility to the small economy?
To assess how beneficial flexibility is to the small country, we first calculate the long-
run production potential eS of the small country if it chooses an open-loop behavior
identical to its larger rival. We thus obtain
~S =
(kr) 
3
2
4
(
1

  1) + 1
2
:
The benefit of flexibility can be represented by the difference bS   eS, which is obtained
by comparing the Markovian and open-loop outcomes. It is easy to verify that this dif-
ference is always non-negative. Therefore, given the same parameters, the Markovian
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behavior adopted by the small country is preferable to the open-loop behavior. How-
ever, flexibility does not completely eliminate the potential for collapse; it only makes
its occurrence less likely.
Given that
@(bS eS)
@
> 0, the advantage of the small country’s flexibility increases with its
inefficiency to provide public services. In other words, the economic size of the small
country is more sensitive to an increase in efficiency ( decreases) in the Markovian
scenario.30 Consequently, flexibility counterbalances inefficiency, and the more ineffi-
cient a small country is in providing public inputs, the more valuable flexibility is to
its long-run survival.
Furthermore, higher capital mobility increases the relative advantage of flexibility,
given that
@(bS eS)
@k
< 0. Note that increased capital mobility reduces (k increases) the
long-term economic potential of the small economy; however, this occurs to a lesser
extent in the Markovian scenario. It follows that flexibility countervails the negative
effect of high capital mobility, and flexibility brings greater benefits to the small coun-
try when capital mobility is low. So, we can conclude by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The benefit of flexibility decreases with the small country’s efficiency to provide
public services and increases with capital mobility.
We finally observe that similar to the Markovian scenario, the small country never
collapses by adopting an open-loop behavior when capital mobility is sufficiently low.
However, this condition becomes more restrictive in the open-loop scenario. Indeed,
the absence of flexibility in policy making requires now that the mobility cost is higher
than k, which exceeds the threshold k corresponding to the Markovian case.31
30In fact, it is convenient to verify that
@ bS@  < @ eS@ .
31It is convenient to show that k = ( 14 )
1
3
1
r
.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate whether a small open economy can survive in the long-
run when facing global competition. To this end, we model the dynamic competition
between two unequally sized economies. The policy makers of these two countries
compete simultaneously by taxing mobile capital and offering public services. Firms
choose to locate their capital in the country where their profits are maximized. We
characterize the heterogenous behaviors of the two governments within a differential
game framework, in which the small state adopts Markovian (i.e., flexible) behavior,
and its larger rival commits to a strategy developed at the initial time point (i.e., open-
loop behavior).
The results show that under conditions of high capital mobility, the small economy
will risk economic collapse if it provides public services inefficiently. When capital
mobility is very low, the economy of the small state always expands despite its limited
institutional capacity.
However, further research is needed. In the present study, countries are treated solely
as maximizers of tax revenue, and this over-emphasizes the role of tax rates in the
long-run outcomes. Therefore, it would be interesting to analyze a scenario in which
governments are welfare maximizers and take into account the well-being of their pop-
ulations. The present paper alsomodels the private sector in an elementaryway. Coun-
tries are undifferentiated in their ability to produce private goods and the production
process is static. Future research should thus consider how international competition
is able to impact the growth process of these competing economies when private pro-
ductivity differs between jurisdictions.
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Appendix A
We define as follows the notion of heterogenous strategic behavior which is used in
Dockner et al. (2000, Pages 87–92)32.
A.1 Definition A A 2-tuple (	1;	2) of functions 	1 : [0; 1]  [0;+1) ! R2+ and 	2 :
[0;+1) ! R2+, with 	1 = (	11(S; t);	12(S; t));8(S; t) 2 [0; 1]  [0;+1) and 	2 =
(	21(t);	22(t)), constitutes a heterogenous Strategic Nash Equilibrium if an optimal
control path exists and is given by the Markovian Strategy
(a1(t); T1(t)) = (	11(S(t); t);	12(S(t); t)) = 	1(S(t); t)
of player 1, and an open-loop strategy
(a2(t); T2(t)) = (	21(t);	22(t)) = 	2(t)
of player 2.
The small open economy (the Markovian strategic player) takes the large country’s
(open loop) strategy 	2(t) as given, and hence, faces the following optimization prob-
lem 8>>><>>>:
max
a1;T1
Z 1
0
e rt

(S(t)T1(S; t))
1
2   
2
a21(S; t)

;
subject to _S(t) =
a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
  	21(t) 	22(t)
k
:
(3.9)
The corresponding current-value Hamiltonian is
H1(T1; S; a1; 1) =

S
1
2 (t)T
1
2
1 (S; t) 

2
a21(S; t)

+1

a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
  	21(t) 	22(t)
k

with the costate variable 1.
32A different but similar idea of guessing symmetric strategies via the Pontryagin maximum principle
are also used in Cellini and Lambertini (2004 and the references therein). For a recent and detailed
survey see Long (2010).
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The large economy faces the following problem8>>><>>>:
max
a2;T2
Z 1
0
e rt

((1  S(t))T2(t)) 12   1
2
a22(t)

;
subject to _S(t) =
	11(S; t) 	12(S; t)
k
  a2(t)  T2(t)
k
:
(3.10)
The large country conjectures that the small economy’s strategies33 are 	11(S; t) =
1
k
1(t) and 	12(S; t) =

k
21(t)
2
S, 8S 2 [0; 1] and t  0. The current-value Hamil-
tonian of the large economy is defined by
H2(T2; S; a2; 2) =

(1  S(t)) 12T
1
2
2 (t) 
1
2
a22(t)

+2

	11(S; t) 	12(S; t)
k
  a2(t)  T2(t)
k

with the costate variable 2.
The first order conditions yield the small economy’s equilibrium choices T1(S; t) =
k
21
2
S and a1(S; t) =
1
k
. The costate variable verifies the equation _1(t) = r1   k41
with the transversality condition limt!1 e rt1(t)S(t) = 0.
The optimal choices of the large economy are a2(t) =  2(t)k and T2(t) =

k
22(t)
2
(1  
S(t)) with the costate equation
_2(t) = r2   k
42
+
k
4
2
21
: (3.11)
The associated transversality condition is limt!1 e rt2(t)S(t) = 0.
We can readily check that the maximized Hamiltonians H1 (S; 1) and H

2 (S; 2) are
H1(S; 1; t) =
"
k
21
S   
2

1
k
2#
+ 1
 
1
k
  ( k
21
)2S
k
  ( 
2
k
)  ( k
22
)2(1  S)
k
!
33To explain how players in a differential game guess each other’s heterogeneous strategy, first con-
sider the case where both players make open-loop decisions. Then, after having solved the game, we
would get the following solutions: 	1(t) = 	1(S(t); 1(t); t) and 	2(t) = 	1(S(t); 2(t); t), for any t.
However, in our model, the small country makes Markovian decisions. Therefore, the large country,
which is the open-loop player, conjectures that the small economy is a Markovian player. Consequently,
	1(t) = 	1(S(t); t) has to be replaced by 	1(S; t)with any state variable S: Or, more precisely, the large
economy guesses that the small economy’s strategy is: 	1(S; t) = 	1(S; (t); t), for any (S; t).
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and
H2(S; 2; t) =
"
  k
22
(1  S)  1
2

 2
k
2#
+2
 
1
k
  ( k
21
)2S
k
  ( 
2
k
)  ( k
22
)2(1  S)
k
!
:
It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium Hamiltonians are concave with respect
to the state variable S. Hence, ai(t); Ti(t) (i = 1; 2) are optimal paths. It follows that
the large country’s conjecture about the rival’s strategy is optimal. Consequently, the
solutions 	1(S; t) = (a1(S; t); T1(S; t)) and 	2(t) = (a1(t); T2(t)) for S 2 [0; 1] and t  0
constitute a non-degenerate Markovian Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. QED.
A.2 Trajectories
The above analysis shows that there exists a stable trajectory associated to the dynamic
system. In this subsection, we explore the convergence path to the steady state. Tak-
ing into account the initial and transversality conditions, the FOCs yield the explicit
trajectories
1(t) =
1
2

k
r
 1
2
; 2(t) =   1
2

k
2r
 1
2
:
The trajectory of the state variable is
S(t) = (S(0)  bS)e 3rt + bS; (3.12)
which is the optimal path converging to the steady state. The convergence speed is 3r.
A.3 State variable constraint S(t)  S < 1
2
Recalling that the size of the small economy is constrained (S(t)  S  1
2
), we adapt
the Lagrangian function as follows
L1(T1; S; a1; 1) =
h
S
1
2 (t)T
1
2
1 (S; t)  2a21(S; t)
i
+ 1

a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
 a2(t)  T2(t)
k

+(S   S):
The above first order conditions still hold. The costate variable now verifies the equa-
tion _1(t) = r1   k41 +  . Furthermore, we consider the Kuhn-Tucker condition

 
S   S = 0:
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In other words, we have, either S < S with  = 0 or S = S with   0. Because
the small economy’s size is constrained by the upper-bound S, we impose that  = 0
whenever S = S.
Appendix B Budget constraint
In this section, we prove that the present value of net tax revenues (the intertemporal
budget constraint) is strictly positive for all k 2 [k; k] :
The FOCs relative to the Hamiltonians H1 and H2 yield the equilibrium choice vari-
ables of jurisdictions 1 and 2: T1(S; t) =

k
21
2
S(t) , a1(S; t) =
1
k
, a2(t) =  2(t)k and
T2(t) =

k
22(t)
2
(1   S(t)): The FOCs also yield the motion equation of S : S(t) =
(S(0)  bS)e 3rt + bS, where bS = 1
6
p
2
 
1
kr
 3
2 (
p
2

  1) + 2
3
.
Case 1: The small country (i = 1)
Consider first the case of the small country. The above results allow us to compute the
equilibrium present value of net revenues
J1 =
1
4
r
k
r
h
S(0) + 3bSi  1
8kr2
:
It is easy to check that J1 > 0 if and only if S(0)+ 3bS > 12   1kr 32 , which is equivalent to
S(0) > 1
2
p
2
 
1
kr
 3
2   2: The following conclusions can be derived.
(a) If k > k =
 
1
32
 1
3 1
r
, we have S(0) > 0 > 1
2
p
2
 
1
kr
 3
2   2 and the above inequality is
always true, that is, J1 > 0, 8S(0). Considering that bS > 0, we claim that k > k is a
sufficient condition under which the small economy never collapses.
(b) If k < k, the sign of J1 depends on the value of S(0).
(b.1) If 1
2
p
2
 
1
kr
 3
2   2 > S(0) > 0, we have J1 < 0. We also impose that S(0) < 12 .
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Consequently, if 1
2
p
2
 
1
kr
 3
2  2 > 1
2
, that is k < k =
 
1
50
 1
3 1
r
; the small economy collapses
for sure for any initial value S(0).
(b.2) If S(0) > 1
2
p
2
 
1
kr
 3
2   2 > 0, we have J1 > 0. Because S(0) < 12 , we must require
that 1
2
> 1
2
p
2
 
1
kr
 3
2   2, or k > k =   1
50
 1
3 1
r
for guaranteeing J1 > 0. However, this
condition does not rule out that the small country may collapse in the long run. It may
happen that the small economy keeps on shrinking infinitely and converges to 0, such
that lim
t!1
S(t)  ! bS  0. In other words, stating that the small economy is able to
payoff its public debt is not enough for eliminating collapse in the long run. Collapse
is only excluded if the steady state net revenue is positive ( bw1 > 0).
From (a), (b.1.) and (b.2.) we conclude that J1 > 0 for all k 2 [k; k].
Case 2: The large country (i = 2)
Because S(t) < 1
2
; it is easy to show that w2(t) = (1  S(t))
p
2kr  1
16kr
> (1  1
2
)
p
2kr 
1
16kr
> 0 if k > k =
 
1
50
 1
3 1
r
. Consequently, w2(t) > 0; 8t 2 (0;+1) and 8k 2 [k; k].
Under the conditions of our model, the large country will never have to issue debt to
fund its expenditures. It follows that the present value of net tax revenues is always
positively signed. In other words, J2 =
R1
0
e rtw2 [T2(t); a2(t)] dt > 0;8k 2 [k; k] :
After having analyzed the cases 1 and 2, we finally conclude that Ji > 0; (i = 1; 2) for
all k 2 [k; k]. We also conclude that the present value of net revenues in country i is
positive (Ji > 0; i = 1; 2) if the steady state net revenue is positive( bwi > 0; i = 1; 2).
That finishes the proof.
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Part II
Multi-dimensional Jurisdictional
Competition and Policy Coordination
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Chapter 4
On the Desirability of Tax Coordination
When Countries Compete in Taxes and
Infrastructure
4.1 Introduction
The 1 debate over corporate tax coordination among international jurisdictions remains
unresolved. In particular, it has been argued that the member states of the European
Union should coordinate tax policies2 to avoid a “race to the bottom” that would un-
dermine their modern welfare states (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004).3
The classical approach on tax coordination (see for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993;
1This chapter is based on, On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and
infrastructure, Y. Han, P. Pieretti and B. Zou. IMW Discussion paper, 476.
2The Ruding Report (1992) made several far-reaching harmonization proposals related to corporate
taxation, including the imposition of an EU-wide minimum corporate tax rate (Haufler, 1999).
3For this purpose, in the 1990s, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) launched a “harmful tax competition” initiative. In addition, the United Nations (UN) has
called for the creation of an International Tax Organization, which would be specifically charged with
curtailing tax competition.
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Baldwin and Krugman, 2004) takes it for granted that jurisdictions compete in taxes
only and don’t consider other non-tax variables as possible additional and indepen-
dent instruments to attract tax bases. However, several authors argue that jurisdic-
tions not only compete in taxes but also in infrastructure (for example, Hindriks et al.,
2008; Zissimos and Wooders, 2008; Justman et al., 2002, and Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011).
Moreover, recent empirical research (Hauptmeier et al., 2012) demonstrates that juris-
dictions use independent and strategic business tax rates and public inputs to compete
for capital.
Therefore, when jurisdictions can compete with tax and non-tax instruments indepen-
dently, constraining tax rates through tax coordination is likely to create carry-over
effects on other strategic instruments thus creating adverse effects not considered in
the classical approach. Against this background, it is interesting to reconsider tax co-
ordination.
There are some authors (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Fuest, 1995) who consider the im-
pact of public inputs on the production function of firms and thus account for the effect
of infrastructure on internationally mobile capital. However, in these models tax rates
and infrastructure expenditures are not independent variables4. This results formally
from the fact that tax rates and infrastructure expenditures are linked through a bal-
anced budget. According to Wildasin (1991), equilibria in fiscal competition games
with two instruments related via a budget constraint crucially depend on which in-
strument is set strategically. Consequently, if countries interact in taxes, expenditures
are not a strategic variable.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the desirability of tax coordination when
two heterogeneous jurisdictions compete for mobile entrepreneurs using taxes and in-
frastructure investments that improve firm productivity5. These infrastructure invest-
ments may represent material or immaterial public goods such as laws and regulations
4For example, Fuest (1995) recognizes that his model disregards strategic interactions induced by
public infrastructure expenditures.
5In another paper, Han (2013) investigates the issue of partial tax coordination and its welfare impli-
cations. However, this is not the focus in this paper.
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protecting intellectual property and specifying accurate dispute resolution rules.
The literature generally highlights two different ways to coordinate taxation 6 in or-
der to correct the inefficiencies7 caused by tax competition: tax harmonization and
the imposition of a minimum tax rate. Tax harmonization is generally understood as a
transition towards a common rate structure (Keen, 1987; Zissomos andWooders, 2008).
More specifically, in the present paper, we define tax harmonization as the equalization
of tax rates, which is consistent with the tax competition literature (see, for example,
Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Zissimos and Wooders, 2008)
and common policy prescriptions8. The general conclusion of the classical literature is
that appropriately selected uniform tax rates improve efficiency relative to tax compe-
tition. The reason is that an upward harmonization of capital tax rates can produce a
Pareto improvement (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). This conclusion also holds when
the competing countries are asymmetric in size (Kanbur and Keen, 1993).9 Another
type of coordination is the adoption of a minimum tax rate that allows some room for
tax competition. An interesting result highlighted in the literature (see Kanbur and
Keen, 1993) is that the imposition of a minimum tax rate can be Pareto-improving.
A related paper to ours is Zissimos and Wooders (2008). However, there is an impor-
tant difference in the way they treat infrastructure decisions when jurisdictions coor-
dinate their tax rates. For these authors jurisdictions do not adapt their infrastructure
6See for example, Kanbur and Keen (1993), Sørensen (2004), Zissimos and Wooders (2008), and Kon-
rad (2009).
7These concerns are in keeping with the large tax competition literature (for systematic reviews, see
Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Boadway and Tremblay, 2011). The main point is that inde-
pendent governments engage in wasteful competition over scarce capital through inefficiently low tax
rates and public expenditure levels. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) have formally
modeled this process.
8In 2003, the EU Council adopted a voluntary Code of Conduct to combat harmful tax competition,
and more ambitious proposals for corporate tax harmonization have been advanced, including the in-
troduction of a single EU corporate tax (Conconi et al., 2008).
9Kanbur and Keen (1993) show that there exists a critical level above which harmonization results
in tax revenue exceeding, for each jurisdiction, that of the non-cooperative equilibrium. However, a
uniform level between the Nash equilibrium rates is certain to harm the small country.
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decisions to the new environment caused by tax coordination even if these expendi-
ture levels are no longer their best choices. In other words, jurisdictions are supposed
to compete in infrastructure when they don’t constraint their tax rates, but they cease to
compete in public expenditures when taxes are coordinated. In our paper we consider
that tax coordination does not constrain infrastructure competition among sovereign
jurisdictions10.
In the following we assume that two jurisdictions of unequal population size11 com-
pete strategically in taxes and infrastructure expenditures to attract imperfectly mobile
firms. Public infrastructure improvements are attractive to firms because they enhance
private productivity and firms are not perfectly mobile because they incur relocation
costs.
Then, we consider tax harmonization and minimum taxation as alternative coordina-
tion devices and compare tax competition with tax coordination from the perspective
of net total revenue and global social welfare, respectively.
Because two independent strategic variables are involved, we have to clarify the tim-
ing of the game. If we assume that infrastructure spending and tax rates are equally
flexible, the jurisdictions will compete simultaneously in these two instruments. This
is reminiscent of the Marshallian notion of "long run" when all the decision variables
are flexible. However, in a "short term" perspective, tax policy and infrastructure de-
cisions can be unequally flexible. For example, it can take several years to construct
a power plant. On the other hand, the capacity of a plant can be augmented by new
expenditures but cannot easily be reduced. In other words, infrastructure decisions
may involve irreversibility and lack of flexibility. However, we assume that changing
tax rates is more flexible in a short term perspective.
In this chapter we address the two aspects we just highlighted by analyzing two al-
ternative scenarios. In a "long term" view we assume that the jurisdictions compete
10Fuest (1995) highlights how difficult it is to coordinate in taxes and infrastructure.
11Various authors have addressed the importance of size asymmetries in tax competition (Bucovetsky,
1991; Wilson, 1991; Kanbur and Keen, 1993). The general result is that the large jurisdiction issues a
higher tax rate and faces a lower elasticity of capital to the tax rate than its small rival.
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simultaneously in taxes and infrastructure. By contrast, they are supposed to compete
sequentially when the strategic instruments are unequally flexible. In this case, we as-
sume that the governments non-cooperatively select infrastructure levels first and set
the tax rates in a second stage. This is the way two instrument competition is gener-
ally modeled (see Justman et al., 2002; Hindriks et al., 2008; Zissimos and Wooders,
2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011). In doing so we adopt the rule that the most irreversible
decision should be made first.
Generally speaking, the chapter contains two distinct messages. First, when jurisdic-
tions compete in two independent strategic variables, the decision to coordinate on
one variable (a tax rate) induces a carry-over effect on the unconstrained instrument
(infrastructure expenditures). Consequently, classical results of the tax coordination
literature may be qualified. A second message is that the relative flexibility of the
strategic instruments, which may depend on the time horizon of the decision-making,
does matter. In particular, tax coordination is more likely to be detrimental when coun-
tries can compete simultaneously in taxes and infrastructure, rather than sequentially.
The reason is that simultaneity eliminates strategic effects between tax and non-tax
instruments.
The main results may be summarized as follows. When tax revenue is used to gauge
whether tax coordination dominates a non-cooperative equilibrium, the following re-
sults are obtained. If the jurisdictions decide to set uniform tax rates, coordination is
Pareto-inferior to the non-cooperative equilibrium when countries compete in tax and
non-tax instruments. By contrast, if jurisdictions only compete in taxes, our model
indicates that tax harmonization can be Pareto improving.
Coordination consisting of the imposition of a lower bound on tax rates hurts the rev-
enue of the low tax country if jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure. How-
ever, if inter-jurisdictional tax redistribution is feasible and countries compete sequen-
tially in taxes and infrastructure, it is conceivable that the country incurring a tax loss
could be compensated if coordination increases joint revenue. These results are at odds
with a classical outcome (see for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993) that imposing an
appropriate minimum rate improves the revenue of each country when jurisdictions
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compete in taxes alone .
The results differ when we consider the potential welfare gains from tax coordination.
When the jurisdictions decide to set uniform tax rates, the profitability of coordination
crucially depends on the degree of country-size asymmetry if tax and infrastructure
decisions are taken sequentially. If these decisions are taken simultaneously, harmo-
nization is always welfare reducing.
Finally, our model demonstrates that minimum tax coordination always increases so-
cial welfare if jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure sequentially. However,
if countries compete simultaneously this result is reversed.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we model tax and
infrastructure competition between heterogeneous jurisdictions that attempt to attract
imperfectly mobile firms. Section 3 analyzes the conditions under which tax harmo-
nization is more desirable than tax and infrastructure competition. Section 4 examines
the differences betweenminimum tax coordination and tax competition. Section 5 con-
cludes.
4.2 The model
Consider two jurisdictions denoted h and f . The countries’ populations are evenly
distributed with unit density on a segment (0; 1). Country h is assumed to be small in
terms of total population, and its size is given by S with 0 < S < 1
2
. It follows that
the size of country f equals (1  S) 2  1
2
; 1

. Similar to Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we
assume that each individual owns one unit of capital and is simultaneously an entre-
preneur and a worker. In other words, each member of the population corresponds
to a one-person company12. The entrepreneurs can relocate their activity abroad, but
12It follows that the world population coincides with the population of firms. We could assume that
each firm is run by more than one person, but this would unnecessarily complicate the model without
providing further insights.
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moving a company to another country is costly13. Moreover, we assume that the entre-
preneurs are heterogeneous in the ability to cope with the costs associated to business
relocation. They will be ranked according to the ease with which they are able to re-
locate abroad14. The closer an individual is to the border separating countries h and
f , the easier it is for her to relocate abroad. In other words, an entrepreneur of type
 2 (0; 1)who moves abroad incurs a relocation cost of j Sj, which is the ”distance”
between the border S and an entrepreneur of type . Note that, because tax competi-
tion can induce firms to move, relocation costs can be viewed as a distortion affecting
private production.
Firms
Using one unit of capital, each individual living in country j (j = h; f) is able to pro-
duce yj = qj + j units of one final good. The parameter qj (j = h; f) represents firm
specific productivity, whereas j is the output fraction, which is country-specific. More
precisely, j is the level of infrastructure spending planned by the policy-makers in
country j. The focus of the paper is on how size asymmetry and infrastructure ex-
penditures affect the welfare effects of tax competition. Therefore, we assume that
firm-specific productivity is uniform across firms, which means that15 qj = q (j = h; f).
Finally, we assume that the goods are sold in a competitive market with a price nor-
malized to one. The unit cost of production is assumed to be constant and normalized
to zero.
A firm of type x located in the home country h is indifferent between producing at
13Firms that decide to relocate abroad will have to incur several costs resulting, for example, from
losses of real estate sales, moving facilities abroad and from the relocation of workforce. Moreover,
firms will have to collect more or less information on laws and regulations that are specific to foreign
locations. Possibly, they will have to cope with language barriers and different cultures which can affect
the working conditions in the destination country.
14For example, the amount of information that is necessary to transferring activities abroadmay differ
across entrepreneurs. Moreover, the physical relocation costs can be specific to each firm.
15In the following, we assume that q is sufficiently large such that the value of the welfare is nonneg-
ative.
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home and in the foreign country f if
qh + h   th = qf + f   tf   (S   x) ; (4.1)
where th and tf are source-based tax rates levied on capital in countries h and f , re-
spectively.
Similarly, a firm of type x located in the large country f is indifferent between investing
at home and investing abroad if
qf + f   tf = qh + h   th   (x  S): (4.2)
The above two conditions yield
x = (h   f ) + (tf   th) + S: (4.3)
Note that if x > S; firms move from the large to the small country, while if x < S; firms
move from the small country to its larger rival.
Governments
We now assume that countries attempt to attract companies by competing in taxes and
public infrastructure that enhance private productivity. Jurisdictions h and f are thus
able to influence the productivity parameter j (j = h; f) of the firms located within
their respective boundaries. As in Hindriks et al. (2008) and Pieretti and Zanaj (2011),
we assume that one additional unit of the public good produces one additional unit
of the private good. It follows that j also represents the amount of the public good
supplied by jurisdiction j (j = h; f). The cost of providing this public good in each
country j is given by the quadratic cost function C(j) =
1
2
2j . Each jurisdiction j
(j = h; f) is assumed to maximize its total tax revenue16, net of public expenditures,
by selecting the appropriate tax rate tj and infrastructure level j . The governments’
objective functions are given by
Bh = thx  1
2
2h; Bf = tf (1  x) 
1
2
2f : (4.4)
16For a similar assumption, see Kanbur and Keen (1993), Zissimos and Wooders (2008) or Pieretti and
Zanaj (2011).
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Two jurisdictions wish to attract productive capital by competing in taxes and in-
frastructure. In this context it is important to precise in which time sequence the in-
struments are used. Thus, we consider the timing of the game in two different ways.
In a "short term" view when infrastructure decisions are less flexible than tax policy,
the jurisdictions compete successively in two strategic variables. In a first stage, gov-
ernments non-cooperatively select infrastructure levels, and then they set the tax rates
17. In a "long term" perspective, the tax and infrastructure instruments can be viewed
as equally flexible, and a simultaneous game in both instruments is the most suitable.
(a) Simultaneous tax and infrastructure game
The governments set tax rates and infrastructure expenditures simultaneously. The
first order conditions18 yield the following unique equilibrium tax rates
th = S; t

f = 1  S; (4.5)
h = S; 

f = 1  S:
It follows that the number of companies located in countries h and f are, respectively,
x and 1  x, with
x = S:
From the concavity property of the objective function relative to tj and j , it follows
that the strategy-tuple
 
h; 

f ; t

h; t

f

is a unique Nash equilibrium. It is straightfor-
ward to show that x 2 (0; 1) and j  0, (j = h; f) for any S < 12 . It also appears that
th < t

f and 

h < 

f . We have here the standard result that the smallest country sets the
smallest tax rate. Moreover, the country that taxes less than its rival also provides less
public infrastructure. Because the net tax advantage tj   j (j = h; f) of both countries
is zero at equilibrium, no firm will move.
The equilibrium tax revenues of both countries are
Bh =
1
2
S2 and Bf =
1
2
(1  S)2 :
17This choice of sequentiality follows the rule that the most irreversible decision should be made first.
18It can be easily verified that the objective function is jointly concave in the choice variables.
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The joint tax revenue isB = Bh+B

f =
1
2

(1  S)2 + S2. As in Zissimos andWooders
(2008), we define efficiency as themaximum level of surplus available to all individuals
in the two economies
W (x) = (h + f ) + (Bh +Bf ) 
Z jxT Sj
0
ydy: (4.6)
The two terms in the brackets include, respectively, the total firms’ profits19 and total
tax revenues. The last term is the relocation cost faced by relocating companies. Since
firms don’t move in the equilibrium of the simultaneous game, this last term vanishes.
After simplification, the (joint) social welfare W  resulting from inter-jurisdictional
competition equals
W  = q + S2   S + 3
2
.
(b) Sequential tax and infrastructure game
We now assume that the non-cooperative governments first select infrastructure levels
and then set tax rates. Finally, firms decide where to locate their production processes.
We solve the game by backward induction.
Beginning from the second stage, each government maximizes its objective with re-
spect to its tax rate while taking its rival’s rate as given. The first order conditions20
yield the following unique equilibrium tax rates
th =
(1 + S)  f + h
3
; (4.7)
tf =
(2  S) + f   h
3
:
It follows that the number of companies located in countries h and f are, respectively,
x and 1  x, with
x =
(1 + S) + h   f
3
:
19The profit in country j (j = h; f ) is j = (q + j   tj)xj .
20The second order conditions can be easily verified.
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After substituting the above tax rates into the jurisdictions’ objective functions, we can
solve for stage 1 of the game, where the two governments compete in public infrastruc-
ture h and f . It is simple to verify that the objective function Bj (j = h; f ) is strictly
concave in j (j = h; f ). The first order conditions thus lead to the unique equilibrium
expenditures
h =
2
15
(1 + 3S); f =
2
15
(4  3S): (4.8)
Introducing (6.5) into (6.4) yields the equilibrium values
th =
3
2
h ; t

f =
3
2
f : (4.9)
The strategy-tuple
 
h ; 

f ; t

h ; t

f

is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE). Equation (4.9) shows that the country that taxes more than its rival also pro-
vides more public infrastructure.
The number of firms located in equilibrium in country h is given by
x =
1
5
(1 + 3S): (4.10)
It is straightforward to show that x 2 (0; 1) and j  0, (i = h; f) for any S < 12 .
Note that the tax differential between the large and small countries equals
tf   th =
3
2
 
f   h

=
3
5
(1  2S) : (4.11)
It follows that in the sequential version of the game, the small country is able to attract
firms from the large country since th   h < tf   f if 0 < S < 12 . It follows that the
firms which move to the small jurisdiction is x   S = 1
5
(1  2S) > 0 (0 < S < 1
2
).
The equilibrium tax revenues of both countries are
Bh =
7
225
(1 + 3S)2 and Bf =
7
225
(4  3S)2 : (4.12)
The joint tax revenue is B = Bh +B

f .
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Plugging the equilibrium values of h ; 

f , and x
 into (4.6) yields
W  = q +
1
450
(108S2   108S + 577): (4.13)
4.3 Harmonization versus tax competition
We now assume that the two countries cooperatively select uniform tax rates, for a
given level of infrastructure expenditures. Therefore, they only compete in infrastruc-
ture. We further assume that the uniform tax rate is designed to maximize either
global tax revenue or global social welfare. The two cases will be considered suc-
cessively. Then, we analyze the conditions under which harmonization is desirable,
successively applying the tax revenue and social welfare perspectives. In adopting this
approach, we follow Zissimos and Wooders(2008), who compare tax competition be-
tween revenue-maximizing jurisdictions with tax coordination, from the perspective
of social welfare.
4.3.1 Tax harmonization
We define the uniform tax rate as follows
th = tf = t; t  0:
Therefore, the number of firms that locate in the small country is given by
x = (h   f ) + S:
We first solve the infrastructure game. Each jurisdiction selects a level of public in-
frastructure j by maximizing its revenue for a given tax rate t.
In equilibrium, we obtain
uh = 
u
f = t:
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It follows that
xu = S:
The tax revenues of countries h and f resulting from infrastructure competition for a
given uniform tax rate is as follows
Buh = tS  
1
2
t2 and Buf = t(1  S) 
1
2
t2: (4.14)
Joint tax revenue becomes
Bu(t) = Buh +B
u
f = t (1  t) ; (4.15)
where Bu(t) is positive if t 2 (0; 1).
The aggregate social welfare resulting from infrastructure competition with uniform
tax rates is
W u = q + (1 + t  t2): (4.16)
We are now able to calculate the harmonized tax rate. First consider the case where
the jurisdictions agree on a uniform rate that maximizes joint tax revenue. It is easy
to see that t = argmaxBu(t) = 1
2
. It follows, B
u
= Bu(t) = 1
4
, Buh(t) =
1
8
(4S   1) and
Buf (t) =
1
8
(3  4S). If tax harmonization is intended to maximize global social welfare
we show21 that ts = argmaxW u(t) = 1
2
. The resulting maximum social welfare equals
W u(ts) = q + 5
4
.
4.3.2 Comparing net tax revenues
In this section we analyze the desirability of tax harmonization with respect to tax
revenues. Comparing tax revenues resulting from tax and infrastructure competition
with the maximum revenue resulting from tax harmonization shows that Bh > B
u
h(t)
(respectively, Bh > B
u
h(t)) and B

f > B
u
f (respectively, B

f > B
u
f ) for all S 2 (0; 12).
21Assuming that the harmonized tax rate is designed to maximize global welfare is in line with Zissi-
mos and Wooders (2008).
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This result appears in the simultaneous tax and infrastructure game, as well as in the
sequential game. In other words, if the common rate equals t, tax harmonization does
not make either country better off.
The above finding is at odds with classical results, according to which tax harmoniza-
tion dominates pure tax competition if the uniform tax rate is sufficiently high (see for
example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; and Boadway and
Tremblay, 2011). Our model leads to a similar conclusion (see Appendix A) if we re-
strict ourselves to pure tax competition. Indeed, in that case, tax harmonization gen-
erates more revenue than tax competition for both jurisdictions provided that the two
countries are not excessively asymmetric with respect to size. However, if revenue
transfers are feasible, both countries are always better off under an appropriate com-
mon rate.
The idea underlying the above results obtained in case of simultaneous tax and in-
frastructure game can be explained as follows. First, it should be noted that, in our
model, harmonization is equivalent to infrastructure competition with constrained tax
rates. It is then obvious that introducing more flexibility in the use of competition in-
struments does not hurt the payoffs obtained with less flexibility. Specifically, when
jurisdictions are also free compete in taxes they have an additional variable to max-
imize their respective net tax revenue that will be at least as high as in the case of
tax harmonization. Formally speaking the net revenue function Bj (S); (j = h; f) is
the envelope of Buj (S) (j = h; f). When the considered jurisdictions are equally sized
(S = 1
2
) and when they compete simultaneously in two instruments, it is easy to show
that Bj (S) = B
u
j (S). This is because the mix of tax and infrastructure decisions is not
altered by tax harmonization when S = 1
2
.
When countries compete sequentially, the previous effect remains but is augmented
by a strategic effect. As in Hindriks et al. (2008), our model implies that the more
jurisdictions improve their attractiveness by investing in infrastructure in the current
period, the fiercer tax competition will be in the second stage. The competing juris-
dictions anticipate this effect in the first stage and thus underinvest in infrastructure
relative to the tax harmonization scenario. To highlight this strategic effect, assume
68
that the jurisdictions are equally sized. It is then easy to show that tax harmonization
does not increase taxes but increase infrastructure expenditures in both jurisdictions.
Consequently, harmonization decreases net tax revenue in each country.
We can now state the following proposition
Proposition 1Moving from tax and infrastructure competition to tax harmonization decreases
the tax revenues of all competing countries. This holds true in a simultaneous tax and in-
frastructure game as well as in a sequential game. However, if the countries compete in taxes
only, harmonization can be Pareto-improving in tax revenue.
4.3.3 Comparing social welfare
Now we use social welfare to gauge the desirability of tax harmonization. To this end,
consider the welfare differences,W  W u(ts) (respectively,W  W u(ts)) between the
competing jurisdictions. We successively analyze two cases.
(a) Simultaneous tax and infrastructure game
In this case infrastructure investments and tax rates are equally flexible. From the
above analysis, it is easy to show that
W   W u(ts) = (1
2
  S)2;
which is always positive for all S < 1
2
.
Remember that in case of simultaneous tax and infrastructure competition firms don’t
move at equilibrium and thus no mobility costs are involved. In addition we see that
aggregate firms’ profit does not change when we move from tax and infrastructure
competition to harmonization. It follows that the welfare change is only affected by
the change in net tax revenue and thus, the intuition underlying the above result also
proceeds from the fact that harmonization restricts the flexibility in the use of compe-
tition instruments. If S is allowed to vary in the interval
 
0; 1
2

, W (S) is the envelope
ofW u(S).
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(b) Sequential tax and infrastructure game
Now, we assume that infrastructure expenditures are not as flexible as tax rates. Then it
follows from the above results thatW  W u(ts) = 6
25
S2  6
25
S+ 29
900
. It is straightforward
to show that W  < W u(ts) if 1
2
> S > S, where S = 1
2
  5
36
p
6; and W  > W u(ts) if
0 < S < S. It follows that harmonization dominates tax competition as long as the
size asymmetry between the two jurisdictions is not sufficiently high. This result does
not appear if we restrict ourselves to pure tax competition. Indeed, we demonstrate in
Appendix A that moving from tax competition to tax harmonization always improves
social welfare. The result is also in contrast to Zissimos and Wooders (2008) who show
that efficiency can be achieved by setting a common tax rate.
To explain what happens, we can decompose the welfare difference W   W u(ts) in
the following manner
W   W u(ts) = B +; (4.17)
where B = (Bh +B

f )  [Bh(ts) +Bf (ts)] and  = (h + f )  [h(ts) + f (ts)].
From the previous section, we know that the movement from interjurisdictional com-
petition to harmonization decreases net joint tax revenue (B > 0 for all S). However,
it can readily be shown that the same change of regime increases joint profits net of
relocation costs ( < 0 for all S). The increase of relocation costs can be viewed
as a production inefficiency induced by jurisdictional competition. It is reminiscent
of the distortional effect on private production of taxation in the classical tax compe-
tition models22. However, the opposite signs of B and  have a common cause.
Indeed, inter-state competition generates more tax revenue than harmonization but
less infrastructure expenditures. This benefits the governments and, by the same to-
ken, hurts the private economy. Which of the two effects will dominate depends23 on
22In the Zodrow-Mieszkowski (Z-M) type models distortion results from variations in production,
whereas in our model distortion results from moving production from one country to another. In the
Z-M models, capital moves but without cost, whereas in our model, firms, considered as a whole, move
with a cost. In other words, our model does not ignore the harm that taxation can have on private
production.
23More exactly, we have B = 1900
 
504S2   504S + 251 and  =   1150  48S2   48S + 37.
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the value of S. Indeed, it is convenient to show that B +  < 0 if S > S and
B + > 0 if S < S.
When S > S, the degree of size asymmetry between the competing jurisdictions is low
and tax competition is fierce. When a common tax rate is agreed, the two countries
respond by competing more aggressively in infrastructure provision than without tax
harmonization. Consequently, the relative gain in net revenue induced by inter-state
competition is not sufficiently high to compensate for the benefit in private productiv-
ity that is attainable with tax harmonization (B <  ). As a result, tax harmoniza-
tion improves social welfare relative to jurisdictional competition. When the degree of
size asymmetry between the competing countries is large enough, i.e., S < S, tax har-
monization is no more the most efficient option. The two countries are sufficiently dif-
ferentiated and tax competition is now less intense. Taxing captive firms becomes rel-
atively more beneficial than providing a high level infrastructure. In other words, the
harmonization scenario is no more the most appropriate one (B >  ).
The following proposition concludes
Proposition 2
1) When unequal jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure simultaneously, tax har-
monization is less efficient than two instrument competition.
2) When unequal jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure sequentially, tax har-
monization is more efficient than two instrument competition. This result is, however,
reversed if the countries’ sizes are sufficiently asymmetric.
4.4 Minimum tax versus tax competition
We now assume that the jurisdictions agree on a minimum tax rate  which is in be-
tween the tax rates resulting from tax and infrastructure competition. This option has
been analyzed by some authors (see, for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993). We showed
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above that S < 1
2
implies th < t

f (respectively, t

h < t

f ). Thus, the minimum tax rate
 will be  > th (t

h ). In the following, we investigate firstly the SPNE under the con-
straint of a minimum tax rate; then we analyze the implications of this policy coordina-
tion. As a first step we assume that the jurisdictions decide on taxes and infrastructure
expenditures simultaneously and then we consider the case where these instruments
are used sequentially.
4.4.1 Competition with a minimum tax rate
(a) Simultaneous tax and infrastructure game
First, we consider the case where jurisdictions compete simultaneously in taxes and
infrastructure, taking into account a minimum tax rate  . The low tax country h will
set the lower bound as its optimal tax rate24, which is toh () =  . If the common lower
bound  is higher than tf , the high tax country will also set t
o
f () =  , and we recover
the case of harmonization. Thus, we assume that th <  < t

f . The high tax country
then chooses the tax rate tof [t
o
h ()] that is its best response to t
o
h (). Solving the game
yields the SPNE
oh =  ; 
o
f = 1  S; (4.18)
toh =  ; t
o
f = 1  S:
The number of firms that locate in the small country is xo = S.
The tax revenue of the small and the large countries are respectively, Boh = S   12 2
and Bof =
1
2
(1  S)2. The joint tax revenue becomes
Bo = Boh +B
o
f (4.19)
=
1
2
[(1  S)2 + 2S    2]:
Substituting the above equilibrium into (4.6) yields
W o = q +
1
2
[S2   2S(1  )   2 + 3]: (4.20)
24This is because the objective is concave in th.
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(b) Sequential tax and infrastructure game
We now assume that the jurisdictions first compete in infrastructure expenditures and
then in tax rates, which are bounded from below. As we assume that S < 1
2
, in the non-
cooperative equilibrium, the small country is the low tax one. Consequently, the small
country chooses its best tax rate, which is t
h () =  . Solving the game backwardly, we
first analyze tax competition for a given level of infrastructure expenditures and then
consider infrastructure competition. The solution of the game yields the following
subgame perfect equilibrium values

h =

2
; 
f = 1  S +

2
; (4.21)
t
h =  ; t


f = 1  S +

2
:
The share of firms that locate in the small country is x
 = S   1
2
 . As x
 2 (0; 1), we
impose  < m = 2S. Furthermore, to guarantee that m > t

h , S >
1
7
is required.
Therefore, in the sequel we assume that  2 [th ;minftf ; mg] and 12 > S > 17 .
The tax revenue of the small and the large countries are, successively, B
h = S   58 2
and B
f =
1
8
(2  2S + )2.
The joint tax revenue becomes
B
 = B
h +B


f (4.22)
=
1
2
[(1  S)2 + (1 + S)    2]:
The equilibrium social welfare resulting from the above equilibrium is
W
 = q +
1
8
[12  4(2  S)S + (4  3) ]: (4.23)
4.4.2 Comparing tax revenue
We then analyze whether tax coordination, by imposing a minimum tax rate, increases
the tax revenues of the competing countries. To this end, we compare for each country
j (j = h; f ) the difference Bj  Boj (respectively, Bj  B
j ).
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(a) Simultaneous tax and infrastructure game
When jurisdictions choose taxes and infrastructure simultaneously, we see that for S <
1
2
, we obtain Bh   Boh = 12(S   )2 and Bof = Bf = 12(1   S)2. It implies that setting
a minimum tax rate has no impact on the high tax country, while it reduces the net
tax revenue of the low tax country25. The underlying intuition can be explained as
follows. Tax coordination forces the low tax country to increase its tax rate and the
provision of infrastructure. However, the attractiveness of the low tax jurisdiction does
not change. Consequently, the high tax country will not have to react, neither in taxes
nor in infrastructure provision.
(b) Sequential tax and infrastructure game
In Appendix B (claims 1 and 2), we show that for S < 1
2
we obtain Bh > B


h and
B
f > B

f . In other words, imposing a lower bound on tax rates does not unanimously
improve the revenues of both coordinating countries. Indeed, it appears that the lower
tax country loses tax revenue by moving from a non-cooperative equilibrium to min-
imum tax coordination. Consequently, accounting for the fact that countries can, in
addition to tax competition, also compete independently in infrastructure qualifies a
classical result (see Kanbur and Keen, 1993) according to which imposing a minimum
tax rate Pareto-improves the countries’ tax revenues (see Appendix A). Our results
also differ from Zissimos and Wooders (2008), where tax coordination can be Pareto-
improving in terms of revenue gains.
However, if coordination improves joint revenue, the winner could possibly compen-
sate the loser and each country could thus be made better off. Therefore let us analyze
whether a joint revenue improvement (B
 > B) is possible. In Appendix B (claim
3), we show that for  2 [th ;minftf ; mg], we have B < B
 if S < 43   59
p
3. In
other words, for certain minimum rate choices, there is no room for compensation if
the degree of size asymmetry is not sufficiently high.
The underlying intuition can be explained as follows. When the low tax country de-
25From the noncooperative equilibrium, we know that th = S, and the minimum tax rate  lies be-
tween the noncooperative equilibrium rates. Hence, Bh  Boh = 12 (S   )2 > 0 always holds.
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cides on its infrastructure provision at the first stage it knows that it will have to set
a minimum tax rate later, which is higher than the current (competitive) rate. In or-
der to avoid fierce tax competition in the future, the low tax country underinvests in
infrastructure relative to the coordination scenario when jurisdictions can compete si-
multaneously in two instruments. As a result the low tax country becomes relatively
less attractive to foreign investments. Net tax revenue decreases in the low tax country
and it increases in the high tax country.
The following proposition summarizes the above findings
Proposition 3
1) Assume that jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure simultaneously. Moving
from tax and infrastructure competition to minimum tax coordination makes the low tax
country worse off. The high tax country is not affected.
2) Assume that jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure sequentially. Moving from
tax and infrastructure competition to minimum tax coordination has opposite effects on
the jurisdictions’ tax revenues. The high tax country’s revenue is improved, while the
low tax country is made worse off. If the degree of size asymmetry is not sufficiently high,
there is no scope for compensating the loser, even if a compensation mechanism exists.
4.4.3 Comparing social welfare
To analyze the impact of the tax bound on social welfare, we compare the welfare with
and without a minimum tax rate,W o  W  (respectively,W
  W ).
(a) Simultaneous tax and infrastructure game
When taxes and expenditures are set simultaneously, we see thatW o W  = 1
2
(S )2,
which is positive. In other words, the imposition of a minimum tax rate reduces social
welfare.
(b) Sequential tax and infrastructure game
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In Appendix B (claim 4), we show that moving from a non-cooperative equilibrium to
minimum tax coordination always increases social welfare.
The following proposition concludes
Proposition 4
1) Assume that jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure simultaneously. Moving
from tax and infrastructure competition to minimum tax coordination reduces social
welfare.
2) Assume that jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure sequentially. Moving
from tax and infrastructure competition to minimum tax coordination improves social
welfare.
4.5 Conclusion
The purpose of the chapter is to investigate whether tax coordination is desirable when
countries compete in taxes and infrastructure. To address this question, we develop a
model where governments strategically select tax rates and the level of public expen-
ditures (simultaneously or sequentially) to maximize net tax revenues. In addition
we assume that the population size of the competing countries is asymmetric. The
desirability of tax coordination is then separately analyzed through its impact on tax
revenue and social welfare.
Two things are worth noting. First, when jurisdictions compete in tax and non-tax in-
struments, tax coordination impacts the non-tax instrument in a way that qualifies
classical results derived from pure tax competition. Second, the relative flexibility be-
tween tax and non-tax instruments matters when the desirability of tax coordination is
assessed.
Our results are in stark contrast to the findings of the pure tax competition literature
and generally differ from Zissimos and Wooders (2008). This is particularly relevant
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for policy issues because the belief that tax competition generally causes the "erosion
of national tax bases" may prove erroneous if countries compete in tax and non-tax
instruments. Indeed, in our two-country model we show that a uniform tax causes
a tax loss to each country and that imposing a minimum tax rate only hurts the low
tax jurisdiction. These results are however strongly contrasted if jurisdictions only
compete in taxes.
The insights just highlighted don’t hinge on simplifying assumptions which made in
our model. For example, assuming welfare maximizing jurisdictions rather than tax-
revenue maximizers would not change the basic messages of the paper26.
In a future paper it would be interesting to extend the present analysis to unequally de-
veloped countries. This would beg the following question. Can tax and infrastructure
competition be a way for lagging countries to catch-up in terms of economic develop-
ment? Future research could also address the same question by employing a dynamic
version of our model. This would allow to investigate under which conditions tax
and infrastructure competition could, in the long run, promote convergence across un-
equally developed countries.
26For similar results see Han (2013) who analyzes partial tax coordination in a two-instrument com-
petition model. In this framework the competing jurisdictions are assumed to be welfare maximizers
and a more general production function is considered.
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Appendix A
A.1 Pure tax competition
In the case of pure tax competition, we assume h = f = 0: Solving the tax game yields
the equilibrium rates of countries h and f , which are respectively tTh =
1
3
(1 + S) and
tTf =
1
3
(2  S). The corresponding countries’ tax revenues are BTh = 19 (S + 1)2 =
 
xT
2
and BTf =
1
9
(2  S)2 =  1  xT 2. The joint tax income is thus BT = 1
9
(2S2   2S + 5).
A.1.1 Tax harmonization
The impact on tax revenues
If both countries opt for tax harmonization, the uniform tax rate can equal any value
tu 2 [0; 1]. As a result, xu = S companies will be located in the small country and 1 
xu in the large economy. The tax revenues of the two countries are then respectively
Buh = t
uS and Buf = t
u(1   S). The joint maximal revenue is Bu = Buh + Buf = tu. It is
now convenient to show thatBu > BT ; if t 2 [5
9
; 1] for all S 2 (0; 1
2
): It implies that if the
unified tax rate is higher than 5
9
, tax harmonization generates higher total tax revenue
than pure tax competition. This is consistent with the tax competition literature (see
for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004 and Boadway and
Tremblay, 2011).
We now consider each country individually. For the high tax country we can easily
show that Buf > B
T
f for S 2
 
0; 1
2

and t 2 [ (2 S)2
9(1 S) ; 1]. In the same way we can show
for the low tax country that Buh > B
T
h for all S 2
 
7
2
  3
2
p
5; 1
2

and t 2 [ (1+S)2
9S
; 1].
In other words, if the competing economies are not too uneven in size, the presence
of a uniform tax rate, which is high enough, leads to a Pareto-improvement in tax
revenue. Moreover, each country can bemade better off for any S 2  0; 1
2

, by imposing
a uniform tax rate t 2 [5
9
; 1], if inter-jurisdictional revenue redistribution is feasible.
The impact on social welfare
If tax rates are the same across jurisdictions, the social welfare equals W u = q: The
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aggregate welfare resulting from pure tax competition isW T = q   1
18
(2S   1)2. Con-
sequently we get W T  W  =  1
2
( tTf   tTh )2 < 0: Moving from tax competition to tax
harmonization is thus welfare improving.
A.1.2 Minimum tax
The impact on tax revenues
We assume that the tax rates set by the jurisdictions are now bounded from below
by  such that  2  tTh ; tTf  : In that we follow Kanbur and Keen (1993). The small
country will set eth =  since it is its best choice. The high tax country chooses its best
reply etf = 2 + 1 S2 : It follows ex = 12(1 + S   ): The tax income for each country is
respectively eBh = 12(1 + S   ) and eBf = 14 (   S + 1)2. The aggregate tax income is
then eB = 1
4
(S2   2S + 4    2 + 1) :
It is then easy to check that for  > tTh we have
eBh > BTh and eBf > BTf . It follows that
imposing a minimum tax rate to the competing jurisdictions is a Pareto-improvement
in tax revenue. This result is reminiscent of Kanbur and Keen (1993).
The impact on social welfare
The social welfare resulting from a minimum tax bound  2  tTh ; tTf  equals fW = q  
1
2
(1
2
  1
2
   1
2
S)2: Hence, fW   W T = 1
72
(S   3 + 1) (7S + 3   5) : Since  2  tTh ; tTf 
it is straightforward to show that W () > W T : Consequently, a minimum tax lying
between the non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates is welfare improving. This result is
in line with Kanbur and Keen (1993).
A.2 Claims and their proofs
Claim 1. With  2 [th ; tf ], we always have Bh > B
h .
Proof. Recall that the tax revenue of country h resulting from sequential tax and in-
frastructure competition is Bh =
7
225
(1 + 3S)2. The non-cooperative equilibrium tax
rates are th =
1+3S
5
and tf =
4 3S
5
. In addition, B
h = S   58 2 is positive only if
0 <  < 8S
5
. It is easy to check that B
h reaches its maximum at b = 4S5 . Furthermore,
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B
h is decreasing in  for  2 [b ; tf ]. Since b   th =  1 S5 < 0; it follows that B
h
decreases in  for  2 [th ; tf ] and reaches its maximum at th . Therefore, to prove the
claim, we only need to show that Bh > B


h (t

h ). It is straightforward to show that
Bh  B
h (th ) = t

h
360
(101  57S) > 0. That finishes the proof.
Claim 2. There is Bf < B


f for  2 [th ; tf ].
Proof. We know that B
f =
1
8
(2   2S + )2 and Bf = 7225 (3S   4)2. Given that B
f is
increasing in  for  2 [th ; tf ], the claim is proved if the inequality B
f > Bf holds for
the minimum value of B
f which equals to B


f (t

h ) =
1
8
 
11 7S
5
2
. After straightforward
calculations, we get B
f (t

h ) Bf = 18
 
11 7S
5
2   7
225
(4  3S)2 > 0 for any 0 < S < 1
2
.
Claim 3. For 4
3
  5
p
3
9
< S < 1
2
, there exists interval of  , such that, for  2 (th ; ), we have
B > B
.
Proof. Set x = 1   S and let  = 1   1
2
x  
q
13x2
100
+ 3x
25
  13
225
and  = 1   1
2
x +q
13x2
100
+ 3x
25
  13
225
be the solutions of	() = B B
 = 0: The function	() is negative
for  2 ( ; ), since it is convex in  and reaches its negative minimum at b 2 ( ; ). It
can further be checked that  > th if
1
2
< x < 5
p
3 3
9
 
< 6
7

and that tf <  if
1
2
< x < 6
7
.
It follows that 	() > 0 for  2 (th ; ) which is only possible for x 2

1
2
; 5
p
3 3
9

, or
equivalently for 1
2
> S > 4
3
  5
p
3
9
.
Claim 4. W
 > W  for  2 [th ;minfm; tf g] with m = 2S.
Proof. It is convenient to show that, function
H(S) = W
  W  =

7
15
2
+
37
50
S(S   1) + 
8
(4  3)
is strictly convex and reaches its minimum at S = 1
2
. Moreover, at this minimum,
H

S =
1
2

=
59
25  72 +

8
(4  3) > 0;
where the last inequality comes from the fact that  2 (0; 1) which was implied by
 2 [th ;minfm; tf g].
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Thus, for any 0 < S < 1
2
, we have H(S) > H
 
S = 1
2

> 0. We finish the proof.
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Chapter 5
Who Benefits From Partial Tax
Coordination?
5.1 Introduction
The1 issue of corporate tax harmonization has been debated in the European Union
(EU) since the European Economic Community was established. Specifically, in 2003
the EU Council adopted a voluntary Code of Conduct against harmful tax competi-
tion, and more ambitious proposals for corporate tax harmonization have been pro-
posed, including the introduction of a single EU corporate tax (see Conconi et al.,
2008). The primary motivation for this is that the growing economic integration has
increased international mobility of capital and labor, which increasingly places down-
ward pressure on national tax policies. Consequently, many authors have noted that
independent governments engage in wasteful competition over scarce capital through
inefficiently low tax rates and public expenditure levels (Zodrow and Mieszkowski,
1986; Wilson, 1986). Accordingly, tax coordination is proposed to correct the alleged
inefficiencies caused by tax competition, as is highlighted in the tax literature (for sys-
1This chapter is based on, Who benefits from partial tax coordination? Y. Han, CREA Discussion paper,
2013-24.
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tematic reviews, see Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Boadway and Tremblay,
2011).
However, neither a common corporate tax rate nor a minimum tax rate2 has been suc-
cessfully implemented in the EU3. Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) argue that some
countries may prefer a low tax status4. This is exemplified by tax havens, which have
a commercial interest in not harmonizing their taxation levels. Moreover, for political
reasons, it is also not always possible to agree on full tax coordination (Marchand et
al., 2003). Thus, as an alternative, partial tax coordination seems to be a more realistic
policy option. Partial coordination generally describes a situation in which each indi-
vidual agent cooperates with a subset of others but not with everyone in the economy
or the society (Beaudry et al., 2000). The Enhanced Cooperation Agreements (ECAs)5
among EU member states can be regarded as an example of partial coordination6.
The issue of partial coordination has been addressed in the tax competition litera-
ture. Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) demonstrated that in the standard tax compe-
tition framework, tax harmonization among a subset of countries is Pareto improving
if tax rates in the initial fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium are strategic comple-
ments. In addition, Conconi et al. (2008)7 suggest that, if capital is sufficiently mobile,
2The Ruding Committee (1992) proposed a common minimum corporate tax rate for the EU .
3Keen and Konrad (2012) argue that regional blocs other than the EU (Central America, East and
South Africa and elsewhere) have also sought to reach agreements limiting corporate tax competition
among themselves, but as in EU, with limited success.
4Burbidge et al. (1997) theoretically demonstrated that with more than two states, incomplete feder-
ation can be the unique equilibrium by assuming endogenous coalition formation.
5EU member states are divided about whether or not to pursue corporate tax harmonization. For
this reason, a subset of European countries has recently been institutionalized in the form of Enhanced
Cooperation Agreements (ECAs) under the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2003). An ECAs
occurs if not all 27 Member States agree upon cooperation, but only a subgroup (or coalition) among
them (with a minimum of eight).
6Policy coordination among EU member states, rather than coordination with all of the countries in
Europe, can be regarded as another example of partial coordination.
7The paper analyzes partial tax coordination in a context with downward pressure on tax rates due
to tax competition on the one hand and upward pressure on tax rates due to time-consistent confiscatory
taxation on the other.
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partial tax harmonization benefits all countries involved relative to both global and no
harmonization.
Many authors argue that jurisdictions compete not only in taxes but also in the pro-
vision of infrastructure (see Justman et al., 2002; Hindriks et al., 2008; Zissimos and
Wooders, 2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011). However, the existing literature on the desir-
ability of partial tax coordination is primarily based on the assumption that countries
solely compete in tax rates. In the present study, we investigate whether partial tax
coordination8 can benefit the countries within and outside the tax union when coun-
tries use taxes and infrastructure strategically9. One closely related contribution to our
work is Sørensen10 (2004), who shows that, when countries are symmetric, the outsider
enjoys a larger welfare gain from a binding minimum tax than countries in the union.
Given cross-country asymmetries11, the welfare gains from regional tax coordination
mainly accrue to countries with high initial tax rates.
However, our setting differs from that in Sørensen (2004). First of all, taxes and in-
frastructure expenditure are related via a budget constraint in Sørensen (2004), hence
the equilibrium taxes and public expenditures crucially depend, as Wildasin (1991)
noted, on which instrument is strategically selected12. However, recent empirical re-
search (Hauptmeier et al., 2012) demonstrates that jurisdictions use strategic tax rates
and public inputs independently to compete for capital. Our model does not have this
budget constraint13, and hence taxes and expenditures are two independent strategic
8In another paper of mine (Han et al., 2013), we investigate welfare implications of full tax coor-
dination. There we consider a two-country model and tax coordination are implemented in the two
countries. However, in the present paper, we consider a three-country model and only a subset of all
countries coordinate tax policies, which essentially differs from the setting of Han et al. (2013).
9In our paper, we do not focus on the stability of the tax union. We simply assume that the union is
formed by other factors outside the context of the tax competition problem.
10The model in the paper incorporates various forms of taxations, a public consumption good, in-
frastructure provision, and a redistributive lump sum transfer.
11Sørensen (2004) assumes that countries differ in pure profit shares, foreign ownership shares, initial
endowments, and social preferences regarding redistribution.
12Koethenbuerger (2011) also argues that models of local public finance predominantly assume that
local governments set taxes while expenditures are residually determined via the budget constraint.
13This is in the same vein as Hindriks et al. (2008), Zissimos and Wooders (2008), Pieretti and Zanaj
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variables14. In addition, he considers an egalitarian social welfare function15. In our pa-
per, we do not consider the redistributional aspects of tax policies, and thus we assume
that the governments maximize social welfare without concern for inequality. There-
fore, we can exclusively focus on the impact of policy coordination on social welfare.
In the present chapter, we investigate the welfare implications of partial tax coordi-
nation when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure16. To this end, we assume
that only a subgroup of all countries considered forms a union. Moreover, the union’s
member states only coordinate their tax policies while still compete in the infrastruc-
ture provision. This implies that the union countries, while coordinating their tax rates,
are able to adjust their infrastructure policies to attract foreign capital17. In addition,
the union competes in taxes and infrastructure with the rest of the world.
Two partial coordination devices are considered successively. We first discuss the wel-
fare implications of tax harmonization (a common tax rate) within the union. Because
a common tax rate may prove difficult to implement, we consider the case in which a
minimum tax rate is imposed within the union. We then analyze the related welfare
effects.
Our results show that a subgroup of countries agreeing to a common tax rate can have
adverse consequences for both union and nonunion countries. This is in stark contrast
with Konrad and Schjelderup’s (1999) finding that partial tax harmonization is Pareto
improving when jurisdictions solely compete in taxes. Our result also differs from that
(2011), and Hauptmeier et al. (2012).
14The only condition we require is that the budget is non-negative, which is the case because the
jurisdictions are assumed to impose a lump sum tax to finance public expenditures if necessary, as
assumed in Hindriks et al. (2008).
15The government in each country is concerned with the average individual welfare level and the
dispersion of individual utilities around this mean.
16These infrastructure investments may represent material or immaterial public goods such as laws
and regulations protecting intellectual property and specifying accurate dispute resolution rules.
17One may argure that jurisdictions would also coordinate infrastructure expenditures, however, as
Han et al. (2013) suggest that it is not realistic. This is because expenditure coordination would dras-
tically limit sovereign policy making, as many infrastructure expenditures primarily satisfy internal
policy goals and are incidentally attractive to foreign investments.
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in Sørensen (2004), in which partial coordination leaves all countries better off, assum-
ing countries compete in both18 taxes and infrastructure. In addition, we demonstrate
that both high tax and low tax countries can be worse off when a lower tax bound is
applied within the tax union. This result is at odds with Sørensen (2001, 2004), who
concludes that the imposition of a minimum tax rate benefits the high tax country and
harms the low tax country.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we study the welfare implica-
tions of partial coordination when countries only compete in taxes. In section 3, we de-
rive optimal strategies from tax and infrastructure competition for each government.
Section 4 then compares social welfare with and without partial tax harmonization.
The welfare implications of a minimum tax rate are considered in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
5.2 The benchmark
As a benchmark, we first study the welfare implications of partial tax coordination
assuming countries compete only by taxes. As in Sørensen (2004), two cases are con-
sidered. We assume that a tax union implements a common tax rate with symmetric
competing countries. When the countries are asymmetric, we assume that a minimum
tax rate is imposed19 in the union.
5.2.1 Partial coordination with symmetric countries
Consider three identical countries i = 1; 2; 3. They compete in taxes to attract perfectly
mobile capital from the rest of the world. There is no domestic ownership of capital20.
18As we argued above, in his paper, taxes and infrastructure are not independent variables.
19To the best of our knowledge, the welfare implications of imposing of a minimum tax rate among a
subset of countries has not been studied when they solely compete in taxes.
20This assumption is made in several contributions (see, for example, Hindriks et al., 2008; Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi, 2010).
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We assume that the jurisdictions tax capital to extract rents from the capital owners.
The total stock of capital is fixed and normalized to 1. In each country, there is a rep-
resentative firm and the number of residents is normalized to one. The government in
country i selects a unit tax rate ti , which is source-based. Capital locates in the country
where profits are highest.
The production of the representative firm in each country is given by the function
Fi(ki), which is increasing, twice continuously differentiable and concave in the level
of capital ki ( i = 1; 2; 3). Under perfect mobility, the allocation of capital will equate its
net return  across all jurisdictions. This net return is assumed to be positive. We thus
obtain the following equality
 = f1(k1)  t1 = f2(k2)  t2 = f3(k3)  t3; (5.1)
where fi is the marginal product of capital in country i. The above arbitrage condition
determines the amount of capital in each country ki (i = 1; 2; 3). By setting an appro-
priate tax rate ti, each government maximizes the welfare Wi of its residents, the sum
of the return to the immobile factor and the tax revenue,
Wi = Fi(ki)  fi(ki)ki + tiki; (5.2)
which is rebated to the residents. For reasons of tractability, we assume that the pro-
duction function takes the form21
Fi(ki) = aki   b
2
k2i ;
where a > 0 is a shift parameter of the production function and b > 0 is the rate of
decline of the marginal product of capital relative to ki.
The parameter b plays a critical role in our model. The higher the value of b, the lower
the productivity of capital for a given amount of invested capital. As Machlup (1991)
pointed out, the scarcity degree of complementary factors influences the declining rate
in marginal productivity. In other words, the scarcer these factors are the higher the
value of b should be.
21Note that a linear quadratic production function is assumed by several authors, such as Bucovetsky
(1991, 2009), Peralta and Ypersele (2006), and Itaya (2008).
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Because the net return of capital must be nonnegative, we impose the condition22 a
b
>
ki. The welfare function of country i becomes
Wi =
b
2
k2i + tiki:
From (5.1), the capital invested in each jurisdiction is
k1 = k

2 = k

3 =
1
3
:
Maximizing the welfare of each country yields the following optimal tax rates
t1 = t

2 = t

3 =
b
6
:
The corresponding payoffs are
W 1 = W

2 = W

3 =
b
9
: (5.3)
In what follows, we assume that countries 1 and 2 form a tax union and set a common
tax rate tc that maximizes the total welfare of the union. Country 3 remains outside
and observes the coordination inside the union. Therefore, the tax union and country
3 compete for mobile capital by selecting taxes t and t3 noncooperatively. The amount
of capital located in each economy is then k1 = k2 =
1
4
and k3 =
1
2
. Solving the game,
the equilibrium tax rates are
tc =
b
2
; tc3 =
b
4
:
The union as a whole faces a lower elasticity of capital supply than the individual
member states. Thus, the uniform tax rate is higher than the noncooperative equilib-
rium rates, tc > ti (i = 1; 2). Because tax rates are strategic complements, country 3 sets
a higher tax rate than in the noncooperative case, tc3 > t

3. The resulting payoffs are
W c1 = W
c
2 =
5b
32
; W c3 =
b
4
: (5.4)
Comparing welfare levels with and without coordination, it is easy to see that
W ci  W i =
13
288
b > 0; i = 1; 2;
W c3  W 3 =
5
36
b > 0:
22In what follows, we assume that a is sufficiently large.
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That is, partial tax harmonization improves the welfare of all of the countries if we
only consider pure tax competition. This result is consistent with classical results (see
Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999).
5.2.2 Partial coordination with asymmetric countries
Countries can be asymmetric in many respects (see Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991;
Keen and Kanbur, 1993), such as size, initial resource endowments, and productivity.
In our paper, we assume that countries are heterogeneous in their degree of develop-
ment, which is reflected by a country specific productivity parameter. For simplicity23,
we assume24 that countries 2 and 3 are identical but characterized by a higher level
of development than country 1. This is assumed without loss of generality. We thus
assume that F1(k1) < F2(k2) = F3(k3). The different production functions take the
following form
F1(k1) = ak1   b
2
k21; (5.5)
Fi(ki) = (a+ ") ki   b
2
k2i ; i = 2; 3;
where the shift parameter " is positively signed. We first solve the noncooperative
game among the three jurisdictions. We then analyze the welfare effects of the lower
bound on taxes.
When all countries compete, solving25 for the first order conditions (FOCs) leads to the
following equilibrium taxes
tn1 =
b
6
  2"
9
; tn2 = t
n
3 =
b
6
+
"
9
:
It follows that kn1 =
1
3
  4"
9b
and kn2 = k
n
3 =
1
3
+ 2"
9b
. The less developed country attracts
less capital relative to the advanced one, kn1 < k
n
2 = k
n
3 . The tax rate in country 1 is also
23More generally, we could consider that all the countries differ in terms of their level of development.
However, this would unnecessarily complicate the calculations without providing further insight.
24For a similar assumption, see Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), Burbidge and Cuff (2005), and Peralta
and van Ypersele (2005).
25It is easy to check thatWi (i = 1; 2; 3) is concave in ti.
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lower due to its low productivity, tn1 < t
n
2 = t
n
3 . The social welfare levels of the three
countries are
W n1 =
(3b  4")2
81b
; W n2 = W
n
3 =
(3b+ 2")2
81b
: (5.6)
Nowwe assume that countries 1 and 2 agree on aminimum tax rate tl that lies between
the noncooperative equilibrium tax rates. Because country 1 is the low tax jurisdiction (
tn1 < t
n
2 ), it chooses the lower bound t
l as its best strategy26. Countries 2 and 3 anticipate
the tax policy of country 1 and respond strategically. The resulting equilibrium tax
rates are
tl1 = t
l; tl2 = t
l
3 =
1
7
(tl + b+ "):
The capital invested in the different countries is kl1 =
3b 4tl 4"
7b
and kl2 = k
l
3 =
2(b+tl+")
7b
.
As kli  0, we impose b  4"+4t
l
3
. The corresponding welfare levels for each country are
W l1 =
1
98b
(3b  4tl   4")(10tl + 3b  4")
W l2 = W
l
3 =
4
49b
(tl + b+ ")2:
Comparing cooperation with tax competition from the perspective of social welfare
(comparing W li with W
n
i ), we demonstrate that every country will be better off under
cooperation if tn1 < t
l < minf 17
180
(3b  4"); tn2g.
That is, theminimum tax ratemust be higher than the lowest rate in the non-cooperative
case, but sufficiently low for all of the countries to benefit from cooperation.
5.3 Competition in taxes and infrastructure
In this section, we assume that the governments provide local firms with public goods
intended to enhance the productivity of private capital. Countries thus compete both
in taxes and the provision of infrastructure. The level of infrastructure provided by
country i (i = 1; 2; 3) is denoted gi. The results of the noncooperative competition will
26This is because the social welfare function is concave in tax rates.
93
serve as a baseline to gauge the desirability of tax harmonization. In the spirit of Hin-
driks et al. (2008), the production function, which is specific to country i (i = 1; 2; 3)
exhibits constant returns in infrastructure and takes the form
Fi(ki; gi) = (a+ gi) ki   b
2
k2i :
The cost function of the public input is given by ci(gi) =
g2
i
2
; i = 1; 2; 3. The convexity
reflects that the provision of public infrastructure is increasingly difficult. The equilib-
rium share of capital located in each country is determined by the arbitrage condition
 = f1(k1; g1)  t1 = f2(k2; g2)  t2 = f3(k3; g3)  t3; (5.7)
where fi(ki; gi) = (a + gi)   bki is the marginal product of capital in country i and  is
the world interest rate. It follows that the amount of capital invested in country i is
ki =
1
3
  (gh + gj   2gi)  (th + tj   2ti)
3b
; h; j 6= i:
The subscripts h and j (h; j = 1; 2; 3) refer to the other two countries.
Each government selects the tax rate and level of infrastructure that maximize its wel-
fare function
Wi = Fi(ki; gi)  fi(ki; gi)ki + tiki   g
2
i
2
(5.8)
=
b
2
k2i + tiki  
g2i
2
:
In the following, we solve a two-stage game. In the first stage, countries select the
public expenditure levels. Tax rates are set in the second stage for given infrastructure
levels that are selected in the first stage27. We solve the game by backward induction.
27The choice of sequentiality follows the rule that the most irreversible decision must be made first
(see Justman et al., 2002; Hindriks et al., 2008; Zissimos and Wooders, 2008; Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011).
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5.3.1 Tax game
First, we focus on the tax game. It is easy to verify that the welfare function Wi is
concave in ti. The best tax response of country i is
ti =
1
8
[(gh + gj   2gi) + (th + tj) + b] ; h; j 6= i: (5.9)
Because the reply functions are upward sloping, taxes are strategic complements. Note
also that the slope is less than one, which ensures the stability of the equilibrium. By
solving the system of equations (5.9), we derive the Nash equilibrium in taxes
ti =
1
18
[4gi   2(gh + gj) + 3b] : (5.10)
5.3.2 Infrastructure game
At the first stage, each jurisdiction maximizes its payoff with respect to its infrastruc-
ture provision gi. The FOCs yield
gi =
8(2gh + 2gf   3b)
81b  32 ; h; j 6= i:
We require that b > 32
81
to ensure that the objective functions in gi are concave. The
equilibrium public expenditure of country i is
gi =
8
27
: (5.11)
Introducing (5.11) into the equations (5.10) yields the equilibrium tax rate of country i
ti =
b
6
:
The amount of capital invested in country i is ki =
1
3
. The welfare of country i is then
W i =
1
729
(81b  32) ; i = 1; 2; 3; (5.12)
which is positive because b > 32
81
.
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5.4 Partial tax harmonization
In this section, we analyze whether partial tax harmonization is desirable. To that end,
we assume that countries 1 and 2 form a tax union and set a common tax rate t that
maximizes their joint welfare. However, themember states of the union are assumed to
select their infrastructure levels noncooperatively. This is because many infrastructure
expenditures primarily satisfy internal policy goals and are incidentally attractive to
foreign investments. Therefore, it is difficult to coordinate these types of sovereign
decisions. Country 3 stays outside the union and observes the coalition of countries 1
and 2. The outsider competes with the union as a whole by providing infrastructure in
the first stage and competes over tax rates in the second stage. We first solve the game,
and then compare social welfare with and without tax policy coordination.
5.4.1 Competition with partial tax harmonization
Beginning from the second stage, the FOCs in tax rates28 yield
t =
1
6
(g1 + g2   2g3 + 3b); (5.13)
t3 =
1
12
( g1   g2 + 2g3 + 3b):
We observe that the larger the rate of decline of marginal productivity b, the higher the
tax rate will be for a given level of public infrastructure provision. The reason is that
the marginal productivity of capital is lower for a higher value of b, which results in a
lower demand for capital. The competition for capital is relaxed, and tax rates increase.
In the first stage, the three countries compete in public infrastructure. Solving the FOCs
with respect to gi, we obtain the equilibrium levels of infrastructure provision
gu1 = g
u
2 =
23 (9b  4)
18 (24b  13) ; (5.14)
gu3 =
2 (36b  23)
9 (24b  13) :
28It is easy to verify thatW1 +W2 is concave in t andW3 is concave in t3:
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To guarantee the concavity ofWi in gi, we impose b >
77
144
. This condition is fulfilled if
we require that the level of infrastructure gi is nonnegative, which requires that b >
23
36
.
Substituting (5.14) into (5.13), we obtain the equilibrium tax rates
tu =
4b (9b  4)
3 (24b  13) ;
tu3 =
b (36b  23)
6 (24b  13) :
It is easy to verify that the uniform tax rate within the union is higher than that of
the outsider, tu > tu3 , as the union as a whole faces a lower tax elasticity of capital.
However, to remain attractive, the tax union must provide more public infrastructure
than the outsider. Indeed, we obtain gu1 = g
u
2 > g
u
3 . The amount of capital located in
each country is
ku1 = k
u
2 =
2 (9b  4)
3 (24b  13) ; (5.15)
ku3 =
36b  23
3 (24b  13) :
The resulting welfare levels are given as follows
W u1 = W
u
2 =
(9b  4)2(720b  529)
648(24b  13)2 ; (5.16)
W u3 =
(36b  23)2(9b  2)
81(24b  13)2 ;
which are positive when b > b = 529
720
. In the following, we assume that condition b > b
always holds.
5.4.2 Comparing social welfare
Because the member states of the union are identical, we can write
W u1  W 1 = W u2  W 2 (5.17)
=
32
729
  b
9
+
(9b  4)2(720b  529)
648(24b  13)2 ;
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which is a cubic polynomial of parameter b. It is easy to check that W ui   W i > 0
(i = 1; 2), if b > b where29 b = 1:09. Consequently, partial tax harmonization improves
the welfare of countries 1 and 2 if the value of b is sufficiently high. However, setting a
uniform tax rate makes the union members worse off if b < b < b.
To understand the intuition underlying this result, first note that a "low" value of b
(b < b) implies that the demand for capital and hence competition for capital is "high".
However, when the value of b is relatively "high" (b > b), competition for capital is
"low". Furthermore, when the union is constrained by a uniform tax rate, infrastructure
competition becomes more pronounced30 than in the noncooperative case (gui > g

i ).
Thus the intuition is straightforward. When international competition for capital is in-
tense (b < b), partial tax harmonization results in the over-use of costly infrastructure
spending. The additional net output31 induced by an increased amount of infrastruc-
ture spending in the case of partial tax harmonization is overcompensated by the ad-
ditional cost of providing infrastructure. Thus, agreeing on a common tax rate reduces
the welfare of the union countries relative to the noncooperative scenario (W i > W
u
i ).
However, when competition for capital is less intense ( b > b), partial tax harmoniza-
tion improves the social welfare of the tax union (W ui  W i > 0, i = 1; 2), as the net
output increase it induces exceeds the additional cost of providing infrastructure.
The following result can be stated
29We solve the cubic equationWui  W i = 0 (i = 1; 2) for b and obtain that one root is b = 1:09 and
the other two are complex, which is not our interest.
30Note that herewe do not explain the results bymentioning the strategic effect between infrastructure
expenditures and taxes, which is the case in a two-stage game. Generally, governments underinvest in
the second stage to reduce the intensity of tax competition in the first stage. However, the main point
here is that tax coordination results in over-provision of infrastructure by the union. This predicts that
even we consider a simultaneous game in the paper, the results obtained from the two-stage game
remain. Without the strategic effect emerging in the two-stage game, a simultaneous game will lead the
union to respond more aggressively by investing in infrastructure than in the two-stage game.
31Indeed, it is convenient to write Wui  W i = Ii   Ci (i = 1; 2), which means that the welfare
change induced by the transition from noncooperative tax competition to partial harmonization results
from a net output gain (Ii = (Fi(k
u
i ; g
u
i )   ukui )   (Fi(ki ; gi )   ki ) and a change in the cost of
providing public inputs (Ci =
(gui )
2
2  
(gi )
2
2 ), where 
u and  are interest rates with and without
partial tax harmonization, respectively.
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Proposition 1 If a subgroup of countries commits to a common tax rate but competes in in-
frastructure, social welfare in the tax union falls when b < b < b and rises when b > b relative
to noncooperative competition in taxes and infrastructure.
Now consider the impact of partial tax harmonization on the outsider’s welfare. The
welfare change in the nonmember state resulting from partial harmonization is
W u3  W 3 =
32
729
  b
9
+
(36b  23)2(9b  2)
81(24b  13)2 : (5.18)
Solving W u3   W 3 = 0 yields the unique32 root b < bm = 0:76. Consequently, tax
harmonization in the union increases the welfare of the nonmember state when b > bm
but decreases its welfare when b < b < bm.
The underlying intuition can be explained as follows. When the value of b is suffi-
ciently low, b < bm, the member states compete aggressively in infrastructure as we
highlighted above. This results in an over-provision of infrastructure by the union.
Moreover, the infrastructure expenditures of the competing entities (union versus the
outsider) are strategic substitutes33. Consequently, the outsider country will under-
provide infrastructure and compete with low taxes. Eventually, the union attracts more
capital than in the noncooperative case, and hence less capital flows to the nonunion
country. As a result, the outsider’s gain from lower investment costs34 does not com-
pensate for the loss it incurs in net output. Accordingly, its social welfare decreases
when countries 1 and 2 coordinate tax policy. When the value of b is sufficiently high,
b > bm, the member states provide a relatively moderate level of infrastructure. Be-
cause infrastructure expenditures are strategic substitutes, the outsider will not sub-
stantially reduce its provision of public inputs, and tax competition will not be exces-
sively intense. As a result, the outsider will attract sufficient capital35, and hence its
32We solve the cubic equationWu3  W 3 = 0 for b and obtain that one root is bm = 0:76 and the other
two are smaller than b, which violates our assumption that b > b.
33The FOCs of the infrastructure game in the tax harmonization case yield the best response functions
gu1 = g
u
2 =
 46g3+69b
144b 46 for countries 1 and 2 and g
u
3 =
 2gu
1
+3b
9b 2 for country 3.
34Similarly, we consider the decomposition Wu3   W 3 = I3   C3, where I3 and C3 are the
variations in the net output and the cost of infrastructure provision, respectively.
35Note that the world interest rate under partial tax coordination is lower than in the noncooperative
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social welfare will be higher than in the noncooperative case.
The following proposition concludes
Proposition 2 If a subgroup of countries commits to a common tax rate while competing in
infrastructure, the social welfare of the nonmember state declines if b < b < bm and increases
when b > bm relative to noncooperative competition in taxes and infrastructure.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we can conclude the following. When b < b < bm, both the
tax union and the outsider are worse off. When bm < b < b, the tax union is worse off
while the nonmember state is better off. If b > b, all of the countries benefit from the
partial tax harmonization.
These results are at oddswith the findings in pure tax competition (Konrad and Schjelderup,
1999)36, where partial tax harmonization is Pareto improving if the tax rates in the ini-
tial fully noncooperative equilibrium are strategic complements. They are also in con-
trast to the result obtained by Sørensen (2004) that all countries are better off with par-
tial tax harmonization, although the union countries gain less than the outside country.
5.5 A minimum tax rate
In the previous section, we demonstrated that partial tax harmonization does not nec-
essarily improve welfare in the tax union when countries compete in both taxes and
infrastructure. Does the imposition of a minimum tax rate improve the member states’
welfare? To answer this question, we assume that in a first stage, each country nonco-
operatively selects its level of public investment. In a second stage, each country sets
its tax rate subject to a lower bound, which is imposed on the union countries. Country
3 is not subject to this tax constraint.
game.
36Our result also contradicts the finding in Conconi et al. (2008) that partial tax harmonization benefits
all of the countries relative to the noncooperative case.
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5.5.1 Competition with a minimum tax rate
As in the benchmark model (pure tax competition with asymmetric countries), we as-
sume that F1(k1; g1) < F2(k2; g2) = F3(k3; g3)without loss of generality. The production
function takes the form37
F1(k1; g1) = (a+ g1) k1   b
2
k21; (5.19)
Fi(ki; gi) = (a+ gi + ") ki   b
2
k2i ; i = 2; 3;
where " is positive.
By analogy38 to section 3, we are able to demonstrate that country 1 is the low tax
country if all countries choose the levels of their tax rates and infrastructure noncoop-
eratively. Indeed, in equilibrium we obtain
tnon1 = b(
1
6
  6"
27b  16);
tnon2 = t
non
3 = b(
1
6
+
3"
27b  16);
and39
gnon1 =
8
27
  32"
81b  48 ;
gnon2 = g
non
3 =
8
27
+
16"
81b  48 :
Therefore, if a minimum tax rate  is agreed between countries 1 and 2, it only40 binds
country 1 and induces it to choose this lower bound  . Solving the game by starting
from the second stage, countries 2 and 3 set taxes noncooperatively. We obtain the
37The production function is similar to that in Hindriks et al. (2008).
38We solve a two-stage game. In the first stage, countries select the public expenditure levels. Tax
rates are set in the second stage.
39The superscript ”non00 denotes value in the noncooperative equilibrium.
40We only consider the case in which the minimum tax rate lies between the noncooperative equilib-
rium rates, as in Keen and Kanbur (1993).
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equilibrium tax rates
tmin1 =  ;
tmin2 = t
min
3 =
3( + b)(7b  4) + 21b"
147b  88 :
In the first stage, infrastructure expenditures are chosen noncooperatively by all the
countries. Solving the subgame yields infrastructure equilibium
gmin1 =
4( + b)(63b  40)  336b"
7b(147b  88) ;
gmin2 = g
min
3 =
40 [( + b)(7b  4) + 7b"]
7b(147b  88) :
Concavity is guaranteed if b > 200
441
.
5.5.2 Comparing social welfare
Let Wmini and W
non
i denote the welfare of country i with and without minimum tax
coordination, respectively. The welfare difference of the low tax country (country 1) is
W1 = W
min
1  W non1
= A1(b)
2 +B1(b; ") + C1(b; ");
where, A1(b) =  4[21b(49b 16)(105b 82)+3200]49(147b 88)2b2 < 0, B1(b; ") and C1(b; ") are functions of the
parameters b and ". It can be verified thatWmin1  W non1 can be positively or negatively
signed for different parameters (b; ").
The welfare difference of the high tax country i (i = 2; 3) are
Wi = W
min
i  W noni
=
4[(b+ )(7b  4) + 7b"]2(441b  200)
49(147b  88)2b2  
(81b  32)(27b+ 18"  16)2
729(27b  16)2 ;
It can be shown that the sign ofWmini  W noni can be positive or negative depending on
the values of the parameters.
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From the above welfare analysis for the insiders and the outsider, we see that the im-
position of a minimum tax can be welfare improving or welfare worsening both for the
union members and the nonunion member.
To illustrate the impact of a lower tax bound on welfare, we provide simulations with
different values for the parameter41 pair (b; "). The horizontal axis represents  , and the
vertical axis denotes the change in welfare Wi, where W2 = W3.
First, we set b = 1 and consider different values of ". When " = 0:1, we show in Figure
1(a) that the low tax country always loses, while the high tax country (Figure 1 (b))
always gains. However, in Figure 2 when " = 0:3, the low tax country can gain if the
lower tax bound is not excessively high, and countries 2 and 3 lose if the bound  is
excessively low.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
Figure 1(a) social welfare change for
country 1, " = 0:1
0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
(b) social welfare changes for
countries 2 and 3, " = 0:1
41For each figure,  begins at its minimum value, i.e., the noncooperative equilibrium tax rate of
country 1, as we assume that the lower bound lies between the two noncooperative equilibra.
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0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.0010
0.0005
Figure 2(a) social welfare change for
country 1, " = 0:3
0 .010 0 .015 0 .020 0 .025 0 .030
0 .001
0 .001
0 .002
(b) social welfare changes for
countries 2 and 3, " = 0:3
We then set " = 0:2 and consider different values of b. Figure 3 demonstrates that
when b = 0:8, the low tax country loses if the minimum tax rate is excessively high,
while countries 2 and 3 always gain. However, Figure 4 (a) illustrates that country 1 is
always worse off if b = 1:0, while the high tax countries (Figure 4 (b)) can be harmed if
the lower tax bound is not sufficiently high.
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
0.003
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.003
Figure 3(a) social welfare change for
country 1, b = 0:8
0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16
0.020
0.025
0.030
(b) social welfare changes for
countries 2 and 3, b = 0:8
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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
Figure 4(a) social welfare change for
country 1, b = 1:0
0.06 0.07 0.08
0.002
0.004
(b) social welfare changes for
countries 2 and 3, b = 1:0
The results highlighted by the above simulations are in contrast to those resulting from
pure tax competition when a minimum tax rate is imposed. When countries only com-
pete in taxes, we have shown that all of the countries can be better off as long as the
minimum tax is not excessively high. However, our simulations reveal cases where
the imposition of a lower tax bound does not necessarily improve the social welfare of
the member sates42 when the minimum tax rate is sufficiently low. It can even harm
the high tax countries43, which differs from the findings of Sørensen (2001, 2004), who
shows that establishing a minimum tax rate only harms the low tax country. When
the tax bound is sufficiently high, the welfare effects depend crucially on the values of
parameters b and ".
We state the results in the following proposition
Proposition 3 When countries compete in taxes and infrastructure, the imposition of a suffi-
ciently low tax bound within a subgroup of countries does not necessarily improve the social
welfare of the tax union. It can even harm both the high and low tax countries.
42This result still holds when country 1 is the more advanced country. We can demonstrate this in a
similar way and the proof is available upon request.
43Note that the high tax countries could be member or nonmember states.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate thewelfare implications of partial tax coordinationwhen
countries compete strategically in taxes and infrastructure. In a three-country model,
we assume that two countries form a union and only coordinate their tax policy, while
they compete in the provision of infrastructure. Moreover, the tax union competes
with the nonunion country both in taxes and infrastructure. After assuming that all of
the countries are identical, we first analyze the welfare effects of the establishment of a
uniform tax rate within the union. We then explore the welfare effects of a lower bound
on taxes when the member states are asymmetric in their levels of development.
We demonstrate first that partial tax coordination can harm both the member and non-
member states. Essentially, partial tax coordination allows the member states to freely
compete in infrastructure for foreign direct investment while, to some extent, prevent-
ing them from defending their competitive situation in a globalized economy. Second,
we demonstrate that the high tax country can also be made worse off under partial co-
ordination, which contrasts with the general belief that only the low tax country loses.
This could be a caveat for high tax countries such as France and Germany, which are
pushing the European Union to speed up tax coordination efforts44. Finally, our results
suggest that low productivity countries should opt for tax harmonization. Indeed, our
results show that tax harmonization among these countries leaves them better off.
Future research is needed. When the taxation polices of states are subject to policy
coordination, their expenditure decisions are unfettered. To be in a favorable position
regarding the constraints of tax coordination, the competing jurisdictions may choose
to be a leader or a follower in infrastructure competition. Future research should ad-
dress the desirability of tax coordination by endogenizing the timing of infrastructure
decisions. It would be also interesting to investigate how partial tax coordination im-
44As first stated in the Financial Times (May 2, 2003, p2), which was then followed by a report in the
Irish Examiner (an Irish national daily newspaper) on January 18, 2012, indicating that Germany and
France are pushing the EU to speed up tax coordination efforts, despite Irish and British opposition, and
will soon make proposals to harmonize corporate tax rates. The call is contained in a document to be
discussed at the EU summits on January 30 and in March of 2012.
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pacts economic growth both in member and nonmember states, given their incentives
to invest in public infrastructure differ as explained in this paper.
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Chapter 6
Does Size Asymmetry Exacerbate the
Inefficiency of Tax Competition?
6.1 Introduction
Important1 contributions that address capital tax competition between asymmetric
jurisdictions, such as those of Bucovetsky (1991) or Wilson (1991), demonstrate that
larger countries choose higher tax rates than smaller countries because they face a rel-
atively lower tax elasticity of capital and, hence, a lower marginal cost of public funds.
As a result, under their assumptions, equilibrium tax rates differ across states and lead
to an inefficient allocation of capital (Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Burbidge and Cuff,
2005; Boadway and Tremblay, 2011). Particularly, Kanbur and Keen (1993) analyze
commodity tax competition when countries differ in population size. While reassert-
ing the result that smaller countries charge lower tax rates than larger countries, these
authors demonstrate that, under given assumptions, increasing size asymmetry exac-
erbates the inefficiency of tax competition. In other words, increasing size inequality
between jurisdictions makes tax competition more harmful.
1This chapter is based on, Does size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition? Y. Han, P.
Pieretti and B. Zou. Economics Letters (2014), Vol. 122, 16-18.
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However, many authors argue that jurisdictions compete strategically and indepen-
dently with respect to taxes and infrastructure expenditures (for example Hindriks et
al., 2008; Zissimos andWooders, 2008; Hauptmeier et al, 2012). The aim of this chapter
is to show that inter-jurisdictional competition with tax and non-tax instruments may
change the classical view regarding the detrimental effect of increasing country size
disparities. In particular, we demonstrate that this view has no general validity and
depends crucially on the degree of international capital mobility.
6.2 The model
Consider two jurisdictions symbolized by S and L that compete for foreign direct cap-
ital. Population is evenly distributed, with a unit density, over the interval [0; 1]. Coun-
try S is assumed to be small in terms of total population. Its size is given by s; and
0 < s < 1=2. The size of the large country, L, equals 1
2
< 1   s < 1. Similar to Pieretti
and Zanaj (2011), we assume that each individual owns one unit of capital and is, at
the same time, an entrepreneur and a worker. In other words, a one-person company
is associated with each member of the population2. While the entrepreneurs can move
their activity abroad, we assume, similar to Ogura (2006), that they are heterogeneous
in the preferences and can be ranked according to their willingness to relocate abroad.
The closer an individual is to the border separating countries S and L, the easier it is
for the individual to relocate abroad. Specifically, an entrepreneur of type x 2 [0; 1]
who moves abroad incurs a disutility kjx   sj. Here, k > 0 is the unit cost of capital
relocation, which will also be interpreted as the degree of international openness and
jx  sj is the “distance" between the border s and the entrepreneur of type x.
Firms
As in Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we introduce a linear technology in the following way.
2It follows that the world population coincides with the population of firms. We could complicate
the model by assuming that each firm is run by more than one person, but this would unnecessarily
complicate the model without further insights.
112
Each individual in country j (j = S; L) is able to produce, with one unit of capital,
yj = q + j units of one final good, where q is the output share determined by the
private sector3 and j is the fraction depending on a public investment in country j. We
assume that the final good is sold in a competitive market at a given price normalized
to one. Because firms are free to move, location choices must be considered. The capital
owners will set up their activity where profit, net of taxes and moving cost, is the
highest.
Assume without loss of generality that the capital owner x 2 [0; s] living in country S
is indifferent toward producing at home or producing in the foreign country L if
q + S   tS = q + L   tL   k (s  x) ; (6.1)
where tS and tL are source-based tax rates levied on capital in countries S and L, re-
spectively.
It follows that
x =
1
k
((S   L) + (tL   tS)) + s: (6.2)
If x > s; firms move from the larger country to the smaller one, while firms move from
the smaller country to its larger rival if x < s:
Governments
We now assume that the jurisdictions of S and L are able to increase, by appropriate
public infrastructure expenditures, the productivity of all the firms located within their
respective territories. As in Hindriks et al. (2008) and Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we
assume that one additional unit of public good produces one additional unit of private
good. Consequently, the amount of public good supplied by jurisdiction j (j = S; L)
equals j . The cost of providing this public good in country j is given by the quadratic
cost function C(j) =
1
2
2j . Each jurisdiction j (j = S; L) is supposed to maximize its
total tax revenue4, net of public expenditures, by choosing the appropriate tax rate tj
3We assume that q is large enough such that the net income of firms and the social welfare are always
positive.
4For a similar assumption, see Kanbur and Keen (1993), Zissimos and Wooders (2008), and Pieretti
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and infrastructure levels j . The government’s objective functions are thus given by
BS = tSx  1
2
2S; BL = tL(1  x) 
1
2
2L: (6.3)
6.2.1 Competition in taxes and infrastructure
We now consider a situation where the jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastruc-
ture expenditures. To that end, we analyze a two-stage game5. First, the governments
choose the level of infrastructure non-cooperatively and then set the tax rates. Finally,
firms decide where to locate their businesses. We solve the game backwards.
Starting from the second stage, each government chooses the tax rate that maximizes
its objective assuming that the rival’s rate is given. The first order conditions yield the
following unique equilibrium in tax rates:
tS =
1
3
[k(1 + s) + S   L] ; tL = 1
3
[k(2  s) + L   S] : (6.4)
After having substituted the above tax rates into the jurisdictions’ objective functions,
we can solve for stage 1when governments compete for infrastructure expenditures S
and L. Solving the first order conditions leads to the unique equilibrium infrastructure
expenditures
S =
6k(1 + s)  4
3(9k   4) ; L =
6k(2  s)  4
3(9k   4) : (6.5)
Introducing (6.5) into (6.4) yields the equilibrium tax rates
tS =
k[3k(1 + s)  2]
9k   4 ; tL =
k[3k(2  s)  2]
9k   4 : (6.6)
Imposing j > 0; tj > 0 and x 2 (0; 1) requires that k > k = 23 . It is straightforward
to see that, at equilibrium, the productivity of firms will be the highest in the larger
and Zanaj (2011).
5The choice of sequentiality follows from the rule that the most irreversible decision must be made
first.
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country and the tax rate will be the lowest in the smaller country. Indeed, we have
L   S = 2k 1 2s9k 4 > 0 and tL   tS = 3k2 1 2s9k 4 > 0 because 0 < s < 1=2. At equilibrium,
we also show that x   s > 0 where x = 3k(1+s) 2
9k 4 . In other words, the smaller country
attracts a fraction of entrepreneurs coming from the larger jurisdiction by undercutting
the rival’s tax rate even if it can provide attractive infrastructure. The larger country
tries to resist the capital outflow by providing more infrastructure than its small rival.
6.3 Size effect on social welfare
As in Zissimos and Wooders (2008), we define efficiency as the maximum level of sur-
plus available to all individuals in the two economies:
W = (S + L) + (BS +BL)  k
Z jx sj
0
ydy: (6.7)
The two terms in the brackets include, respectively, the joint firms’ profits6 and joint
tax revenues. The last term is the companies’ relocation costs.
We can write more explicitly that
W = q + Sx+ f (1  x)  1
2
2S  
1
2
2L   k
Z jx sj
0
ydy: (6.8)
For analytical convenience, we decompose social welfare in net global production
(	1 = q + Sx + L(1   x)   122S   122L) and total mobility cost (	2 = k
R jx sj
0
ydy).
Substituting the above equilibrium tax rates (6.6) and equilibrium public inputs (6.5)
into (6.8), we obtain
W = 	1  	2 (6.9)
with 	1 = q + 4
(2s2   2s+ 5) k2   36k + 8
(9k   4)2
and 	2 =
1
2
k (1  2s)2 (3k   2)
2
(9k   4)2
6The profit in country j is j = (q +    tj)xj , where xS = x and xL = 1  x.
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It is interesting to see how the jurisdictions’ size asymmetry can affect social wel-
fare. First note that increased size asymmetry induces the smaller country to use
tax-dumping in a more aggressive way. Indeed, the tax differential tL   tS increases
when s decreases. Accordingly, how do the competing jurisdictions change their at-
titudes toward infrastructure expenditures? Above we show that the large country
reacts by augmenting its infrastructure supply in addition to lowering its tax rate,
while the small country reduces its infrastructure expenditures. However, in the ag-
gregate, infrastructure expenditures increase and as a result net global production
(@	1
@s
< 0) also increases. On the other hand, increasing size asymmetry exacerbates
inter-jurisdictional competition and induces more capital to move. As a result, the wel-
fare is negatively impacted ( @	2
@s
> 0). However, the sum of the two just highlighted
effects is uncertain and depends eventually on capital mobility.
When capital mobility is high (k < k < bk , with bk = 1
9
(2
p
7 + 8)), the positive impact of
higher size asymmetry on global net production exceeds the negative effect of higher
capital mobility. Consequently, the social welfare increases (@W
@s
< 0).
If capital mobility is low (k > bk), the opposite effect occurs (@W
@s
> 0). In this case,
capital is relatively captive and inter-jurisdictional competition is weak. It follows that
the incentive to invest in infrastructure is low, and the effect on net world productivity
is moderate. Because the unit cost of moving capital is high, the cost effect dominates
the productivity effect and social welfare decreases. This result is consistent with the
standard tax competition literature (see, for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993), but it
has no general validity7.
The following proposition concludes
Proposition 1 Inter-jurisdictional competition in taxes and infrastructure yields the following
results:
(a) if the degree of international openness is low, k > bk, social welfare decreases with size
7Our model reproduces the classical result if the jurisdictions are only uneven in size and only com-
pete in taxes. The reason is that size asymmetry exacerbates capital mobility without overall output
creation.
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asymmetry;
(b) if the degree of international openness is high, 2
3
< k < bk, social welfare increases with
size asymmetry.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter shows that size disparity among competing economies has an ambiguous
effect on overall social welfare when countries not only compete in taxes, but also in in-
frastructures. The reason is that increasing size disparity impacts the intensity of inter-
jurisdictional competition and thus influences the mix of policy instruments that are
used to attract mobile capital. Basically, increased size asymmetry makes the smaller
country more aggressive in undercutting its rival, and consequently, more firms will
relocate their businesses. In standard tax competition models, relocation is uniquely
wasteful as long as it does not induce (or is accompanied by) additional output cre-
ation.
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